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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Ian S. Urrea 
Master of Arts 
University of Oregon History Department 
September 2019 
Title: “Our People Scattered:” Violence, Captivity, and Colonialism on the Northwest 
Coast, 1774-1846” 
This thesis interrogates the practice, economy, and sociopolitics of slavery and 
captivity among Indigenous peoples and Euro-American colonizers on the Northwest 
Coast of North America from 1774-1846. Through the use of secondary and primary 
source materials, including the private journals of fur traders, oral histories, and 
anthropological analyses, this project has found that with the advent of the maritime fur 
trade and its subsequent evolution into a land-based fur trading economy, prolonged 
interactions between Euro-American agents and Indigenous peoples fundamentally 
altered the economy and practice of Native slavery on the Northwest Coast. Furthermore, 
Euro-American forms of captivity (including hostage-taking and unfree labor) intersected 
with the Native slave economy in distinctive and fascinating ways. Finally, this study 
observes that the Indigenous economic, sociopolitical, and demographic landscape of the 
Northwest Coast underwent various transformations in which captivity in its myriad 
forms assumed a central role. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Agnes Alfred circa 1975.1 
 
 From 1979 to 1985, Agnes Alfred, a Qwiqwasutinuxw noblewoman of the 
Kwakwaka’wakw First Nation in British Columbia, engaged in a series of interviews 
conducted by anthropologist Martine J. Reid and Daisy Sewid-Smith, Alfred’s 
granddaughter. Born in the late-nineteenth century, Alfred delivered to her interviewers a 
veritable wellspring of knowledge regarding her people’s history and culture, knowledge 
which captured centuries of change and endurance. Among Alfred’s recollections were 
highly detailed accounts of violence and captivity, elements that proved critical in the 
history of both the Kwakwaka’wakw and of the Indigenous Pacific Northwest Coast as a 
                                                          
1
 Ulli Steltzer, Agnes Alfred, from Mamalelekala Tribe, Village Island, now Alert Bay, ca. 1975, 
http://collection.legacy.uvic.ca/index.php?id=11440&artifact_action=info. 
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whole. One incident described by Alfred in particular stands out for its sheer brutality. 
Sometime between 1856 and 1860, Alfred’s grandmother (among other relatives) paid 
witness to a raid which devastated the Qwiqwasutinuxw village of Gwayasdums near the 
northern edge of present-day Vancouver Island. The raid, which was carried out by a 
Nuxalk (Bella Coola) party who had originally arrived to Gwayasdums to trade, 
represented the last and perhaps most devastating episode in a long series of conflicts 
between the two groups. According to Alfred, the Nuxalk attack was precipitated by an 
incident in which Alfred’s aunt, then a young girl, stole a Nuxalk hamatsa whistle. The 
following morning, the Nuxalk party attacked Gwayasdums at dawn, killing and taking 
captive most of the village’s inhabitants. In one of her many interviews, Alfred related 
the following grim scene: “There were headless bodies everywhere, lying on the beach. 
They said that all of [Gwayasdums] was red with blood at high tide. My mother told me 
that their bodies looked like those of fish after they had been cut; they had shrunk.” Many 
of those who survived were taken as slaves by the attacking party, including one of 
Alfred’s aunts, and Alfred’s grandmother, Maxwalogwa, was later ransomed by Kwakiutl 
relatives. For the Qwiqwasutinux, the Nuxalk raid at Gwayasdums represented a pivotal 
moment in their people’s long history. According to Alfred, “our people [the 
Qwiqwasutinuxw] scattered,” further noting that the raid’s few survivors dispersed 
among other nearby villages in which they had relations, creating a diaspora which 
introduced severe disruptions to Qwiqwasutinuxw lifeways.2  
                                                           
2
 Agnes Alfred, “ɁAẋẃ’s Version of the War between the Qʷiqʷasuṫinuẋʷ and the Bella Coola,” in 
Paddling to Where I Stand: Agnes Alfred, Qʷiqʷasuṫinuẋʷ Noblewoman, ed. Martine J. Reid, trans. Daisy 
Sewid-Smith (Vancouver & Toronto: UBC Press, 2004), 57-63. 
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 The 1856-60 Nuxalk raid at Gwayasdums, far from being an isolated incident, 
was emblematic of broader changes and disruptions occurring throughout the Indigenous 
worlds of the Pacific Northwest Coast of North America during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Beginning with the first Spanish voyages in 1774, the native peoples 
of the Northwest Coast were drawn into a complex of interactions with European and 
Anglo-American agents, initiating the spread of the differing forms of colonialism which 
have characterized the region to this day. As Spanish, British, Russian, and American 
traders and explorers began their scramble for the valuable resources of the American 
North Pacific with ever-greater intensity, Indigenous economic, political, and social 
landscapes changed in ways that would eventually abet the colonizers. Furthermore, 
violence, captivity, and the institution of slavery, all of which were central features of the 
Northwest Coast human landscape in pre-European times, shifted dramatically with 
increased exposure to the material and political consequences of non-Native colonialism. 
Indeed, the attack at Gwayasdums and its consequences as described by Alfred occurred 
at a point by which the changes produced by colonialism had both cemented themselves 
on the Northwest Coast and wrought devastating ramifications for the region’s 
Indigenous people. 
This work examines the violent changes introduced to the Indigenous worlds of 
the Northwest Coast with a focus on Indigenous and non-Indigenous captivities from 
1774 to the Anglo-American Oregon Boundary Agreement of 1846. Such captivities 
included the Indigenous institution of slavery and captive-taking through warfare as well 
as the Euro-American practices of hostage-taking, unfree labor, and participation in 
Indigenous slaving economies, elements which converged under the colonial context of 
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the post-contact Northwest Coast. With the late-eighteenth century advent of European-
American colonialism in the maritime fur trade, non-Indigenous economic and political 
influences came to fundamentally alter Native practices and political economies on the 
Northwest Coast. Central to these alterations were the pre-existing Indigenous institution 
of slavery and captivity-related practices. Northwest Coast slavery, distinctive among 
related institutions in Native North America as a whole in its hereditary nature, 
experienced consequential shifts throughout the fur trade era, triggering violent processes 
which reshaped the fabric of the region. These recalibrations will be observed over the 
course of three chapters organized along chronological, thematic, and geographical lines, 
covering Indigenous societies from Puget Sound to Alaska (roughly corresponding to the 
Northwest Coast Inside Passage)3 from the late-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth 
century. Though these parameters do not cover the entire Northwest Coast in its sheer 
scale and complexity, they are intended to provide in-depth analyses of specific aspects 
of captivity during the fur trade era as they developed under different colonial and 
economic circumstances.  
This project additionally seeks to address gaps and discontinuities in the relevant 
literature on Northwest Coast slavery and captivity. Though many scholarly works 
(predominately anthropological) have addressed slavery and captivity on the Northwest 
Coast, most notably Leland Donald’s Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of 
North America,4 relatively few works of history have examined these subjects in any 
                                                           
3
 The “Inside Passage” of the Northwest Coast refers to the collection of sheltered marine waterways 
stretching from Puget Sound in the south to Alaska’s Alexander Archipelago in the north. 
4
 Leland Donald, Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1997). 
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substantial capacity. Numerous works of historical literature have analyzed the Northwest 
Coast and its Indigenous societies, most notably Robin Fisher’s Contact and Conflict and 
Joshua Reid’s The Sea is my Country.5 Despite the seeming importance of slavery in the 
Indigenous Northwest Coast social order, however, such relevant historical works have 
generally acknowledged the presence of slavery on the Northwest Coast without 
addressing it thoroughly or including it as a fundamental part of their analyses. 
Conversely, works of anthropology such as Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of 
North America generally fail to situate Indigenous slavery in a broader historical context 
and to examine the myriad changes the institution underwent as a result of Euro-
American colonization substantively, preferring to approach the subject heuristically and 
in a way that renders it static. Furthermore, such anthropological works do not 
sufficiently acknowledge the dynamism of Northwest Coast slavery and captivity in the 
face of profound historical change. This study will attempt to provide an overview of 
these elements and situate them within the broader historical context of colonialism in 
North America and the Pacific, utilizing relevant literature to piece together a more 
complete and coherent picture of Northwest Coast slavery and captivity in relation to the 
Euro-American colonization of the Western Hemisphere and its repercussions. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the dynamism and fluidity of Northwest Coast slavery and 
captivity, observing the ways in which these factors intersected with a broad range of 
material and sociopolitical changes to produce a transformed Indigenous landscape in 
                                                           
5
 Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977); Joshua Reid, The Sea is my Country: The 
Maritime World of the Makahs, an Indigenous Borderlands People (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2015). 
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which pre-colonial social patterns were exacerbated in response to colonial pressures. 
Such an approach is thus necessary to analyze Northwest Coast slavery and captivity not 
only as features of the region’s Indigenous societies, but as important historical forces in 
their own right.  
Chapter one analyzes the early years of the maritime fur trade from initial Spanish 
explorations in 1774 to the first decade of the nineteenth century with a focus on outer 
coast peoples such as the Nuu-Chah-Nulth. This period was marked by rapid changes to 
Indigenous trading patterns and material life. The rise of the maritime fur trade, buoyed 
by Euro-American demand for sea otter pelts, witnessed new violent interactions both 
between rival Indigenous groups and between Native people and Euro-American agents, 
interactions in which captivity played a central role in a destabilized landscape. Chapter 
two shifts the geographical parameters of analysis further north to the present-day US 
state of Alaska. This region saw a concerted effort at colonization by the Russian Empire, 
whose tactics differed substantially from other Euro-American players on the Northwest 
Coast, spurring subsequent interactions distinct to the area. Russian attempts to secure 
political control over Alaska’s Indigenous inhabitants and to exploit the region’s sea otter 
population through the enforcement of captive labor practices on Indigenous bodies 
brought the Empire’s agents into direct conflict with Tlingits in the Alexander 
Archipelago of southeast Alaska. Indeed, the 1802 and 1804 Battles of Sitka and their 
repercussions represented some of the most dramatic events of the fur trade era. Central 
to the build-up, eruption, and aftermath of the conflict were Indigenous and Euro-
American captivities, and the early successes of the Tlingit resistors arguably crippled the 
Russian colonization effort, a development which had immense repercussions for the 
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Northwest Coast as a whole in that Russia’s weakened position delivered an upper hand 
to other colonial powers. 
The third, and final chapter, examines the changes wrought upon Indigenous 
sociopolitics, slavery, and warfare initiated by the shift from the maritime fur trade to a 
new land-based regional economy from around 1810 to 1846. With the decline of sea 
otter populations, the erosion of American dominance in the trade, and the concurrent rise 
of the British Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) on the Northwest Coast, a new trade 
centered on permanent forts emerged, shifting the geographical focus of the fur trade 
economy from the outer coast to the area’s sheltered waterways and rivers, particularly in 
what would become British Columbia. This shift gave rise to newly specialized 
Indigenous middleman communities such as the Coast Tsimshian and triggered changes 
both to the regional slave trade and the social economy of Indigenous slavery itself. This 
same period saw a concurrent rise in violence and slaving activities resulting from the 
dramatic southward expansion of the Lekwiltoks, a group constituting the southernmost 
branch of the Kwakwaka’wakw (Kwaka’la-speaking) people. This expansion, arguably 
unique in the post-contact history of the Northwest Coast, resulted in mass dislocation 
and depopulation among the Coast Salish peoples of the Salish Sea region and was tied to 
the growing profitability of slaving activities resulting from the land-based fur trade and 
the material consequences of trade with Euro-Americans. The violence emergent from 
Lekwiltok expansion reached a dramatic climax in the 1830s Battle of Maple Bay, a 
confrontation in which an unprecedented Coast Salish military alliance exacted revenge 
on the Lekwiltok near present-day Vancouver Island. This chapter will additionally 
analyze the emergence of a vast slaving network on the northern Northwest Coast 
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centering on the HBC post of Fort Simpson. More than any other Euro-American trading 
port on the coast, Fort Simpson fundamentally reorganized its surrounding economic 
networks, a metamorphosis of which slavery was a critical component. Both Lekwiltok 
expansion in the Salish Sea and the emergence of Fort Simpson as a nexus of a regional 
slaving economy were direct consequences of material conditions emerging from Euro-
American colonialism in the fur trade, and the changes manifest in these developments 
ultimately enriched the colonizers and paved the way for the eventual settler-colonization 
of the Northwest Coast in the late-nineteenth century through the creation of vital wealth 
and infrastructure. 
 Beginning with the 1846 Anglo-American Oregon Boundary Agreement, which 
saw nominal political control of much of Northwestern North America split between 
Britain and the United States along the forty-ninth parallel, Euro-American settler-
colonialism emerged on the Northwest Coast, eventually coming to supplant the 
colonialism of the fur trade. It was in this period that Agnes Alfred’s ancestors lived and 
endured through the Nuxalk attack at Gwayasdums as white settlers began streaming into 
Indigenous lands. The attack described by Alfred not only took place in and was the 
result of a violent context emergent from Euro-American colonialism via the fur trade but 
is further symbolic of the changes this work examines. Slavery, captivity, and violence, 
elements which were integral parts of pre-colonial Northwest Coast Indigenous societies, 
were altered in new and profound ways by the fur trade. In both the maritime and land-
based phases of the trade, Euro-American influences and new economies transformed 
Indigenous societies and inter-Indigenous interactions, changes at which violence and 
captivity were at the heart of the matter. Furthermore, the successes and failures of the fur 
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trade colonial project were tied inextricably to these changes, developments which later 
translated themselves onto Euro-American settler colonialism in the region. As such, the 
fur trade and its accompanying violence represented a critical moment in the histories of 
the Northwest Coast’s Indigenous peoples and of the region as a whole. 
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II. SOFT GOLD AND SLAVERY: CONTACT, CAPTIVITY, 
AND VIOLENCE IN THE MARITIME FUR TRADE 
 
Introduction 
 
John R. Jewitt.6 
 
From 1803-5, John R. Jewitt, an English-born armorer and participant in the 
burgeoning maritime fur trade, lived as a slave of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth (Nootka) 
titleholder Maquinna. In retribution for a series of Euro-American insults and misdeeds, 
Maquinna launched a deadly attack on the American brig Boston, burning the vessel, 
stripping it of its valuables, and killing all on board save two captives. Among those 
those taken captive was Jewitt, whose skill in the maintenance and repair of firearms was 
                                                           
6
 John R. Jewitt, from a watercolor, ca. 1820, Archives visual records collection, Royal British Columbia 
Museum Archives. 
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perceived by Maquinna as invaluable. Sometime during his captivity, Jewitt participated 
in a successful raid against a village of Maquinna’s rivals, the “A-y-charts,” in which he 
was permitted to take four people as slaves to “consider as mine.” Jewitt’s now famous 
captivity narrative, though colored by ethnocentric perceptions of Native people, provides 
an invaluable vignette of Indigenous captivities and the influence of the maritime fur 
trade on the social, political, and economic landscape of the Northwest Coast. This 
vignette, however, portrays only fragments of an immeasurably complex web of violent 
interactions in which captivity was central. In order to capture such complexities, this 
chapter will proceed to analyze the captivities which characterized the Northwest Coast 
in two major parts. Part one will provide an overview of Northwest Coast Indigenous 
slavery as an institution and practice at the time of contact and explain its fundamental 
features. The antiquity of Northwest Coast slavery is well attested to in both 
anthropological literature and ethnohistories, and the institution was remarkable among 
broader Indigenous captivities in North America in that it was an inheritable status 
marked by drastic natal alienation. Furthermore, Indigenous slavery often structured 
further acts of violence and captivity arising from the maritime fur trade. Part two 
examines slavery and captivity in the maritime fur trade period, beginning with first 
encounters between Euro-Americans and Native people in the late-eighteenth century 
into the first decade of the nineteenth century. This section will proceed thematically, 
examining multiple aspects of captivity and violence on the Northwest Coast ranging 
from “displaced violence” emerging from the maritime fur trade, the practice of hostage-
taking, and Euro-American involvement in the Indigenous slave system in the purchase 
(or “redemption”) of enslaved people and in an emerging economy of sexual slavery. Part 
12 
 
two will further analyze the effects these factors had on Indigenous communities, 
whether economic dislocation, war, or demographic catastrophe. 
This chapter likewise has a geographic component. Given the circumstances of 
the maritime fur trade, its transient nature, and the geography of the Northwest Coast, 
much of the activity during this era was focused on communities resident in the outer 
coast. Groups such as the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Haida, and Sitka Tlingit became key players 
in the new maritime fur trade economy owing to their position on the Pacific Ocean 
allowing for easy access for trading vessels. Under these circumstances, individual 
titleholders such as Maquinna and Wickaninnish were able to monopolize trade within 
their respective regions, building networks of political and economic dominance through 
violent processes in which raiding and the taking of captives featured prominently. 
Though the rise to power of such Indigenous leaders was relatively brief given the 
decline of sea otter populations by the early-nineteenth century, the regional implications 
of these political and economic shifts were critical to future developments on the 
Northwest Coast. The circumstances generated by Euro-American-Indigenous 
interactions and colonial influence produced complex and varied waves of violence 
which altered Indigenous life, enriched Euro-American players, and ultimately created 
power vacuums which colonizers would later fill in the nineteenth century. Bound up in 
all of these changes were multiple forms of captivity, an underlying current which created 
a fluid and volatile landscape. 
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An Overview of Northwest Coast Slavery 
 
Kwakwaka’wakw “Slave Killer” war club. This designation comes from the use of such 
implements in the ritual killing of slaves during pre- and post-contact times.7 
 
 The Northwest Coast of North America was among the last regions in the 
Western Hemisphere to experience colonial penetration given its remote geography and 
then-weak Euro-American interest in the North Pacific. When the first European 
expeditions arrived at the Northwest Coast, they encountered highly sophisticated and 
well-established “complex hunter-gatherer” Indigenous societies. Such societies, in 
contrast to western conceptions regarding the linear development of civilization, were 
characterized by strong social stratification manifest in regimes of hereditary rank that 
existed alongside marine-oriented hunter-gatherer economies. These ranking systems in 
large part consisted of three clearly distinguished groups: a “class” of wealthy and 
                                                           
7
 Slave Killer Club, ca. mid-nineteenth century, Arts of the Americas, Brooklyn Museum. 
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ceremonially powerful titleholders at the top, a stratum of freeborn commoners in the 
middle, and enslaved people at the bottom.8  
In contrast to other forms of historical Native captivity in North America, 
Northwest Coast slavery possessed a number of distinctive traits, and scholarly 
knowledge regarding the institution has been developed through the works of numerous 
archeologists, anthropologists, and ethnohistorians. As summarized by Orlando Patterson, 
a preeminent scholar of slavery, the status of an enslaved person consists of four 
constituent parts: the status of the enslaved is permanent, his/or status is created and 
maintained by violent exertions of power, slaves experience “natal alienation,” and the 
status of enslavement carries a certain stigma or “dishonor.” According to anthropologist 
Leland Donald, all four of these components are applicable to the practice and institution 
of Northwest Coast slavery. Unlike many other systems of captivity in Native North 
America, slavery as a status was inheritable on the Northwest Coast, thus the child of an 
enslaved mother was likewise enslaved. The majority of enslaved people on the 
Northwest Coast were captured in violent circumstances, primarily warfare in raiding, 
and slaves belonging to a titleholder’s household were often subjected to various forms of 
systemic violence. Like in other systems of chattel slavery, enslaved persons were 
considered as property of the titleholder’s household or clan, and pertinent literature 
suggests that they were conceptualized as non-human by the free populations with whom 
they resided, though this latter point is controversial. This extreme dehumanization ties in 
well with Patterson’s last two characteristics of enslavement. Enslaved people on the 
                                                           
8
 Kenneth M. Ames, “Slaves, Chiefs and Labor on the Northern Northwest Coast,” World Archaeology vol. 
33, no. 1 (June 2001): 1-17; Donald, Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America, 1-11. 
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Northwest Coast experienced dehumanization through natal alienation in that the act of 
enslavement severed the ties of kinship necessary for legitimate personhood in Northwest 
Coast societies, being violently alienated from their home communities. Exceptions to 
this circumstance were made for those of high rank who were captured in warfare, as 
captives of greater means could be “redeemed” through ransom by family members. 
Overall, however, the status of slavery carried an immense degree of stigma and was 
typically perceived as the highest dishonor. As explained by Peter Kelly, a Haida 
reverend and Native rights activist who grew up in the late-nineteenth century, slavery 
was a dishonor not only to the enslaved but to the community from which he or she was 
captured. According to Kelly, to be taken captive in a raid demonstrated personal 
weakness as well as the weakness of the attacked community in that it displayed that 
community’s inability to protect its own people, further relating an oral history in which a 
Haida woman took her own life rather than be taken captive. Although it is unclear 
whether this perception was shared by all or even the majority of Northwest Coast 
societies, the view presented by Kelly demonstrates the immense dishonor associated 
with being taken captive and or made a slave.9 
Freeborn perceptions of the enslaved as “dishonored,” “non-human” property in 
Northwest Coast societies meant that slaves could be traded, bartered, or gifted (and even 
killed) in potlatch ceremonies. Indeed, enslaved people were highly valued as items of 
trade and brought status to their owners in the “prestige economy.” Thus, in both pre- and 
                                                           
9
 Donald, Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America, 70-73; Orlando Patterson, 
“Slavery,” Annual Review of Sociology vol. 3 (1997): 407-449; Peter Reginald Kelly, “Peter Kelly 
Interview,” interviewed by Imbert Orchard ca. 1965, Imbert Orchard Fonds, Royal British Columbia 
Museum Archives (audio cassette). 
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post-contact times, extensive slave trading networks existed as did the frequent 
acquisition of captives through war. As Donald observes, women and children were 
generally favored as potential captives during slave raids, many captured in raids were 
already enslaved, and such attacks were so commonplace that most villages were fortified 
at the time of contact. Prior to the contact period, slave raids typically occurred within 
close proximity of the raiders’ village, and while most raids were maritime in nature, 
some were carried out on foot. Slave-trading networks in the contact period were 
immensely complex, and it appears that these networks were already in use during the 
pre-European era. The complexity of these networks indicates that the demand for 
captives was high in many Indigenous communities, and while this can partly be 
attributed to their role in the “prestige economy,” Donald (among others) argues that the 
value of slave labor was likewise a determining factor. Slaves not only bolstered the 
prestige of titleholders, but further performed valuable and necessary labor in local 
subsistence economies alongside commoners, allowing their owners to pursue activities 
relevant to their status as titleholders. The rich marine of environment of the Northwest 
Coast necessitated the effective management of resources and manpower, and thus slave 
labor was crucial to this management. Additionally, slave labor provided advantages in 
that slaves (owing to their status) existed outside of the normal parameters of gender in 
Northwest Coast societies, as anthropologist Kenneth Ames argues. Among the free 
population, the division of labor was regimented along gendered lines, and the status of 
enslaved people as “genderless” meant that they could perform tasks typically assigned to 
17 
 
the opposite gender.10 As such, their labor was highly valued given this versatility, 
though it remains unclear whether Ames’ analysis is universally applicable to Northwest 
Coast societies. 
The factors and conditions of slavery on the Northwest Coast coalesced to create 
complex economies of violence, and these characteristics of the Northwest Coast slave 
complex would later prove important with contact and the initiation of Euro-American 
colonialism in the fur trade. As this chapter will argue, Northwest Coast slavery formed a 
baseline which would structure various forms of captivity in the maritime fur trade, and 
the aspects of the Indigenous slave system outlined would be adapted to the 
circumstances of the trade and its outcomes. This is particularly true for the practice of 
slave raiding and the regional slave trade. Slave raiding, already a potent political and 
economic weapon in the pre-European era, would assume new imperatives and urgency 
with the scramble for “soft gold” in sea otter pelts during the trade, as well as allow a 
new class of middleman titleholders to grow wealthy and politically influential. The slave 
trade network of the Northwest Coast would likewise be altered by the Euro-American 
presence, and in the maritime fur trade period, Euro-Americans participated in the slaving 
economy directly. Furthermore, the power dynamics of the Northwest Coast system of 
rank, itself sustained by slavery, would come to structure the myriad interactions, 
captivities, and forms of violence to emerge as a result of the trade. As such, the system 
of Indigenous slavery on the Northwest Coast proved critical to the events of the late-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
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Captivity and Encounter in the Maritime Fur Trade 
 
 
Depiction of a sea otter (Enhydra lutris) c. the late-eighteenth century. The exorbitant value placed on the 
sea otter’s thick coat (“soft gold”) by Euro-American traders and Chinese merchants triggered an intensive 
(and violent) series of hunts on the Northwest Coast that resulted in immense changes for Indigenous 
societies.11 
 
 The first documented European-Indigenous encounter on the Northwest Coast 
was between Russians in the Chirikov Expedition and Tlingits in 1741. Although the 
encounter was brief and consisted of an apparently awkward exchange of goods on the 
water, it left an indelible impact on Russian perceptions of Native people. A number of 
crew members wandered to the shore, ostensibly to search for supplies, and failed to 
return. The Russian explorers surmised that the missing sailors had been taken captive, 
though it appears likely that the missing men deserted. The next major encounters 
between Euro-Americans and the Native peoples of the Northwest Coast initiated the 
early stages of colonization in the maritime fur trade. In July of 1774, a Spanish 
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expedition under the command Juan Pérez made contact with a party of Haidas off the 
northern coast of Haida Gwaii (Queen Charlotte Islands), the second major encounter 
after Chirikov’s expedition. During this reconnaissance mission, dispatched to counter 
Russian incursions in the Spanish-claimed North Pacific, a number of Haida canoes 
paddled within reach of the ship and its occupants, scattering white feathers and singing 
as a gesture of peace before commencing a “brisk” trade with the Spaniards. The 
Spaniards received sea otter, wolf, and beaver pelts in exchange for varied goods 
including knives, initiating the first of countless exchanges which came to characterize 
the maritime fur trade.12 
 Spanish expeditions, launched initially to enforce Spain’s claims to the North 
Pacific and conducted under a veil of secrecy, did not remain hidden from public view in 
Europe and the United States for long. Britain soon learned of Spanish activities in the 
North Pacific, and in 1778, Captain James Cook’s expedition to the Northwest Coast 
brought the United Kingdom into the fray. Furthermore, the widespread publication of 
Cook’s findings ignited Euro-American public interest, and soon the maritime fur trade 
began in earnest. The 1780s were a decade of frenzied Euro-American trading and 
exploration forays into the waters of the Northwest Coast, catalyzing the rise of what 
would become a multi-million-dollar industry at its heyday. Euro-American traders, 
especially Americans outfitted in Boston, soon found a highly lucrative market for 
luxurious sea otter pelts in China, whose various manufactured goods (including silk and 
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porcelain) were in high demand in both the United States and Europe. Indeed, English 
Captains Nathanael Portlock and George Dixon of the ships King George and Queen 
Charlotte fetched nearly $55,000 at Canton following extensive trade with Indigenous 
people on the Northwest Coast in but one example of the highly lucrative nature of the 
trade in sea otters. Though American traders had come to dominate the sea otter trade by 
the late 1780s at the expense of other Euro-American players, the maritime fur trade had 
become a bustling enterprise, and various native groups were eager to do business with 
traders regardless of their nationality. Given the geography of the Northwest Coast and 
the transient, maritime nature of the trade, Indigenous peoples on the outer coast came to 
benefit most (as well as monopolize) from these exchanges. Groups such as the Haida, 
the Sitka Tlingit, and above all, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, came to occupy a privileged 
position in the emerging economic order, one that would have immense implications for 
the Native socio-economic landscape of the region.13 
 The privileged position offered to outer coast peoples in the early maritime fur 
trade generated profound economic and political changes for the communities most 
involved. This was especially true for Nuu-Chah-Nulth peoples of western Vancouver 
Island. With the massive infusion of wealth and Euro-American manufactured goods, 
Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholders embarked on processes of power-consolidation that shifted 
the regional balance of power, processes in which captivity played a paramount role. One 
such person was the Mowachaht titleholder Maquinna of Yuquot at Nootka Sound, who 
by the 1790s had become perhaps the most powerful Indigenous leader on the coast. 
Owing to Nootka Sound’s fortuitous geography as a natural harbor on the outer coast, it 
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grew to become a preeminent trading center throughout much of the maritime fur trade. 
Between 1785 and 1795, 70 of the 107 foreign vessels engaged in the Northwest Coast 
trade during those years called at Nootka Sound, a situation which created opportunities 
for Yuquot which Maquinna readily exploited. Maquinna positioned himself as a 
middleman between Native people and Euro-American traders, using his family’s 
hereditary rights to local lands, waters, and resources to exact tribute from outsiders who 
wished to trade with foreign vessels, transforming Nootka Sound from a seasonal hunting 
site into a predominately year-round settlement and port of call of which he was the 
primary manager. One example of this middleman role came in Euro-American reports 
that the Nimpkish of northern Vancouver Island delivered to Maquinna almost 6,000 
otter pelts a year during the 1780s and 1790s for trade with foreign merchants, indicating 
the scale of his network, his growing monopolization of regional trade, and the wealth 
which his village enjoyed during the period. Maquinna’s growing power was additionally 
bolstered by the construction of Fort San Miguel (or Santa Cruz de Nutka) by Spaniards 
in the early 1790s. Though the Spanish settlement was short-lived and Spain was 
ultimately ousted from the Northwest Coast as a result of the Anglo-Spanish “Nootka 
Controversy” (a turn of events which dealt a blow to Maquinna), Fort San Miguel 
provided Maquinna with increased trade and with much needed goods, particularly 
foodstuffs, enabling him to devote more resources to his various activities.14 Nootka 
Sound’s metamorphosis into a year-round port of call devoted primarily to trading 
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introduced dislocations to the local Indigenous economy, resulting in food shortages 
arising from a shift from traditional subsistence patterns to a predominately merchant 
economy.15 Maquinna initially welcomed the creation of Fort San Miguel as a 
mechanism by which to circumvent these dislocations (although relations with the 
Spanish sporadically turned violent), allowing a brief respite from critical shortages and 
enabling his rise to power. Furthermore, through gift-giving via the potlatch ceremony as 
well as arranged marriages, Maquinna forged an enlarged network of economic, political, 
and tributary alliances on Vancouver Island, creating a veritable confederation with 
Yuquot at its center.16 Maquinna’s rise to power, however, was far from peaceful in 
nature. 
 Conflict, particularly slave raids, served a critical function in creating and 
maintaining Maquinna’s networks. The introduction of Euro-American firearms to Nuu-
Chah-Nulth communities via their privileged position in the early maritime fur trade was 
a particularly important factor in allowing titleholders such as Maquinna to exact power 
through violence. As historian David J. Silverman relates, English sailors from the 
Vancouver Expedition found Maquinna and his people in possession of at least one-
hundred Spanish muskets in 1792, and Captain George Vancouver found that 
Kwakwaka’wakws on eastern Vancouver Island possessed firearms obtained from the 
Nuu-Chah-Nulth through trade. Many firearms were likewise obtained from American 
traders. According to Spanish Botanist José Mariano Moziño in his account of Nootka 
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Sound in 1792, Noticias de Nutka, the American captain John Kendrick sold Maquinna 
one swivel gun and furnished his ally Wickinanish of Clayoquot with “more than two 
hundred guns, two barrels of powder, and a considerable portion of shot,” indicating the 
extent to which Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholders amassed Euro-American weaponry. 
Through the acquisition of firearms, Maquinna was able to expand his power through 
military prowess, and raiding became a means through which to accomplish this end. In 
an attempt to secure greater political power and attain sea otter pelts for trade with Euro-
Americans, Maquinna led a naval assault on an unnamed community to the north of 
Yuquot, netting a “great booty of sea otter skins” according to Englishman John Meares. 
In his captivity narrative, John Jewitt described one such raid which took place in 1804 in 
which he participated. By 1804, Nootka Sound had begun to decline in importance to the 
trade due to sea otter population decline and tensions with Euro-Americans stemming 
from incidents such as the attack on the Boston, weakening Maquinna and frustrating his 
attempts to maintain power and prestige. To stymie the growing threat to his power, 
Maquinna launched a raid on another (likely Nuu-Chah-Nulth) village fifty miles away 
which Jewitt referred to as A-y-charts. At dawn, Maquinna’s party launched a surprise 
attack on the village, killing an undisclosed number of its inhabitants, plundering its otter 
skins, and taking several captives, four of whom Jewitt was allowed to keep and 
“consider as mine.” Jewitt’s account is perhaps the best recorded example of Maquinna’s 
raiding and slaving activities, and it is apparent that the titleholder embarked on many 
such excursions during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Maquinna 
expanded his slaveholdings through raiding and trading, in turn protecting his community 
from slave raids at the height of his power. Furthermore, Jewitt related that by 1803, 
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Maquinna possessed almost fifty slaves in his household, indicating his success in the 
regional slaving economy.17 Maquinna’s rise to power, as well as his extensive slaving 
activities, thus appear as a direct product of circumstances arising from the maritime fur 
trade. 
 Another powerful Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholder to benefit from the maritime fur 
trade was Wickaninnish, leader of the village Opitsatah at Clayoquot sound. 
Wickaninnish, who entered an alliance with Maquinna through an arranged marriage, 
arguably utilized violence and slave-raiding to a greater effect than his ally during his rise 
to power. The Haachahts people of Barkley Sound more than any other group 
experienced the brunt of Wickaninnish’s consolidation of power, falling prey to a ten-
year campaign of subjugation fueled by Clayoquot’s immense stores of Euro-American 
weaponry. During this lengthy war, Wickaninnish plundered extensive quantities of sea 
otter pelts and, one can assume, captives, wealth which he used to further bolster his own 
strength through the purchase of ever greater numbers of Euro-American firearms. The 
alliance between Wickaninnish and Maquinna further fortified the former’s regional 
influence, and this relationship evidently proved beneficial to both men. One example of 
this mutually beneficial relationship was a raid on the Haachahts intended to cement the 
alliance between Yuquot and Clayoquot, carried out by Maquinna on Wickaninnish’s 
behalf. With an army of almost 600 men, Maquinna launched a surprise raid at dawn on 
the Haachahts, killing and capturing nearly everyone in the village. This attack and its 
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outcome not only proved Maquinna’s loyalty and netted the titleholder greater wealth and 
prestige, but further benefited Wickaninnish in his campaign to subjugate the Haachahts. 
Such attacks sent a message to all those who would resist the influence of the Nuu-Chah-
Nulth power-players, utilizing violence and fear of enslavement to further the political 
aims of Maquinna and Wickaninnish. Furthermore, as historian Joshua Reid argues, such 
violence was in many cases “the result of imperialism,” since the scramble for sea otter 
pelts generated by the maritime fur trade created “displaced violence” which “happened 
along indigenous lines of tension.”18 As such, the shifting political and economic 
landscapes of the trade with Euro-Americans were fundamentally tied to acts of violence 
of which captivity was a constituent part. Indigenous forms of captivity were not, 
however, the only forms of violence to characterize the maritime fur trade period.  
 With contact and the initiation of the maritime fur trade in the late-eighteenth 
century, fluid, complex, and often contingent interactions ensued within the context of 
mutual cultural illiteracy in which captivity often played a paramount role. The taking of 
hostages in order to attain certain goals played a crucial role in the early years of the 
maritime fur trade. Historian David Igler describes captive-taking in these contexts as 
“convention,” the voluntary exchange of hostages occurring with such frequency that it 
constituted a mutually-intelligible protocol. Igler further claims that contact “was a 
process by which notions of freedom and captivity intersected and were constantly 
negotiated” and that these processes were ultimately a phenomenon that operated at 
“local, regional, and Pacific-wide” levels given the need to assert power and authority in 
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complicated, dynamic circumstances by all groups involved.19 Essentially, the 
“convention” of hostage-taking described by Igler functioned as a mechanism through 
which Euro-American and Indigenous agents asserted their demands in contact scenarios 
characterized by linguistic and cultural barriers. However, one must question the degree 
to which Igler overemphasizes the “voluntary” and “mutual” nature of such exchanges, a 
line of analysis which draws heavily from historian Richard White’s notion of “the 
middle ground.”20 While many interactions involving the use of hostages were voluntary 
and mutual, however, an equal number were non-consensual and implied anything but an 
equal footing with regards to power. As this chapter will demonstrate, Euro-American 
traders and explorers in particular were quick to exploit the use of hostages to achieve 
various ends as well as to employ “pedagogic violence”21 in what amounted to one-sided 
exchanges of power. 
 The taking of hostages, whether voluntary or involuntary, began with the earliest 
expeditions to the Northwest Coast and soon became a pervasive feature of Indigenous-
Euro-American interactions. In a 1779 voyage to the Northwest Coast, the ships Princesa 
and Favorita, then commanded by Ignacio de Arteaga and Juan Bodega y Quadra, 
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arrived to Bucareli Bay in Tlingit Country in search of a suitable site for a prospective 
Spanish garrison. Though the exchange between expedition members and local Tlingits 
began amicably, a number of incidents (including the destruction of a cross erected by the 
Spanish) produced friction. This tension reached a boiling point when two crew members 
of the Princesa went missing, prompting Arteaga to seize a nearby canoe and take its 
occupant hostage. A standoff ensued between the crew of the Princesa and the local 
Tlingit community in which a sailor offered to the Tlingits in exchange for a titleholder 
was seized, prompting conflict in which the Favorita opened fire on Tlingit canoes and 
killed at least one person. During a stay at Fort San Miguel at Nootka Sound, Francisco 
de Eliza oversaw a strikingly similar exchange. A cabin boy disappeared from Eliza’s 
ship San Carlos, prompting crew members to storm Maquinna’s village in search of the 
boy, taking two locals hostage in order to secure the boy’s return. Eliza’s men soon 
learned that the cabin boy had deserted to Yuquot of his own volition, and the hostages 
were freed and provided with gifts as compensation.22 Such instances not only 
demonstrate the imperial sense of entitlement which Euro-American agents felt to seize 
and exert power over Indigenous individuals, but likewise indicated the important role of 
captivity in the form of hostage-taking in controlling contact scenarios. Furthermore, 
Euro-Americans active on the Northwest Coast were quick to take notice of slavery 
within the Indigenous societies they interacted with. To assert power over Native people 
(particularly those of high status) through hostage taking represented a profound (albeit 
temporary) inversion of the indigenous sociopolitical order. 
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 Like Spaniards active on the Northwest Coast, British and American agents 
likewise used the practice of hostage-taking as a tool for leverage in their interactions 
with Indigenous people, often in ways which complicate Igler’s description of the 
“convention” of captive-taking. One such agent was captain James Colnett, who from 
1786-89 led a British expedition to the Northwest Coast in which the taking of Native 
hostages was a veritable protocol. In July of 1787, Colnett detained an elderly man 
(presumably a titleholder) at Nootka Sound, suspecting the latter of hostile intentions. In 
1791, Colnett oversaw yet another hostage-taking scenario at Clayoquot Sound. 
Following the death of six presumably British sailors whose vessel had collided with 
rocks in the vicinity of Clayoquot, Colnett took a titleholder by the name Tootiscoosettle 
and one other lesser titleholder hostage, threatening to kill the two men and “every native 
he could find” unless the bodies were procured. Colnett evidently got what he desired, as 
Tootiscoosettle survived only to be taken hostage again, this time by American captain 
Robert Gray of the Columbia, the latter of whom had a particularly violent reputation 
among Indigenous people and Euro-American traders alike. In June of 1791, Gray 
detained Tootiscoosettle, ostensibly to force the return of a missing crew member named 
Atu (a native of Hawai’i) whom he assumed local villagers were harboring. This incident 
began proceedings overseen by Gray in which Wickaninnish participated, and according 
to Columbia crew member John Boit, Clayoquot emissaries returned to the ship some 
time after with Atu before ransoming Tootiscoosettle. This was not the last violent 
encounter between the people of Clayoquot and Captain Gray, however. In 1792, Gray 
ordered his crew to raze Wickaninnish’s village of Opitsatah after its inhabitants had 
departed for a potlatch ceremony. Gray suspected that Wickaninnish had hostile 
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intentions given the latter’s accumulation of firearms and previous hostile encounters 
such as his abduction of Tootiscoosettle. As Boit described it, the village, which 
consisted of upwards of 200 homes “generally well built for Indians,” was “in short time 
totally destroy’d” after Gray’s crew set fire to every structure.23 This incident, which 
evidently contributed to tensions culminating in Wickaninnish’s failed attack on the brig 
Tonquin almost ten years later, had its roots in multiple factors arising from the maritime 
fur trade and its impact on indigenous communities. Political and economic realignments 
combined with the practice of hostage-taking and the questionable motives of individual 
Euro-American actors produced friction which sporadically erupted into violence, 
demonstrating the multiple moving parts and contingencies which Euro-American 
colonialism in the maritime fur trade unleashed on the Northwest Coast. Hostage-taking 
thus acted as fuel for conflict in an ironic turn, complicating Igler’s portrayal of such 
practices as generally mitigating conflict. The negotiation of such confrontations and the 
assertion of power, however, were far from the only rationale which animated the taking 
of hostages. 
 In many cases of Euro-American hostage-taking, economic gain was the primary 
motivation for detaining Indigenous people. Such manifestations of violence typically 
took on the form of ransoming high-ranking Indigenous men for sea otter pelts and other 
valuable objects during visits to multiple ports of call on the Northwest Coast. John 
Kendrick, an eccentric American captain and associate of Robert Gray active in the 
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Pacific Basin during the late-eighteenth century, was one of many Euro-Americans who 
participated in the emerging ransom economy. During a 1789 stay at Haida Gwaii, 
Kendrick took two Haida titleholders captive, ostensibly in retaliation for a previous 
theft. Kendrick proceeded to tie his hostages to two ship cannons and threatened to blow 
the men up unless the stolen items were returned and the Haidas turned over their entire 
fur supply. Kendrick ultimately received what he wanted, and the furs he ransomed soon 
were added to his growing fortune. Haida Gwaii in particular appears to have been a 
hotbed of Euro-American ransoming. The Haida titleholder Kow reported that in 1795, 
English captain William Wake of the ship Prince William Henry imprisoned him and two 
other prominent titleholders before ransoming them for 200 sea otter skins. A similar 
incident occurred in 1802 when American captain Jona Briggs took two Haida 
titleholders captive at Masset before returning them in exchange for 100 furs. Such 
incidents justifiably enraged Haida communities, and a number of violent incidents 
erupted as a result of Euro-American depredations. In 1791, Haidas at Coyah’s Harbor in 
southern Haida Gwaii attacked the Columbia in retribution for past transgressions by 
Kendrick. The attack was a failure, however, as forty-five Haidas were killed, though 
Haida retribution continued and Haidas garnered a reputation as being “warlike” among 
Euro-Americans. Indeed, in 1801, Haidas attacked the ship Belle Savage, and in 
response, the crew of the ship Charlotte abducted and executed five Haida titleholders.24  
As such, Euro-American ransoming of indigenous leaders for financial gain was not only 
pervasive, but generated cascades of violence that proved detrimental for Native people. 
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The Short-lived Spanish settlement of Santa Cruz de Nutka and Fort San Miguel in the late-18th century.25 
 
Despite its scale, however, the taking of hostages was not the only from of 
captivity in which Euro-Americans engaged. Euro-Americans participated directly in the 
institution of Native slavery and the Indigenous slave trade in myriad ways. The first to 
implicate themselves in the Indigenous slave trade were Spaniards, who employed a host 
of justifications for their involvement. In 1789, at the height of Anglo-Spanish tensions 
regarding nominal control of Nootka Sound, captain José Estéban Martínez of the ship 
Princesa oversaw the purchase of a number of slave children from the Nuu-Chah-Nulth. 
These purchases were ostensibly motivated by Euro-American fears of Indigenous 
cannibalism, which by the 18th century had become a common trope in western 
perceptions of Native people. Martínez had received reports from multiple colonial 
agents that Maquinna and his sub-chief, Callicum, routinely cannibalized slave children 
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from their households, and John Kendrick alleged that he had been offered “a chunk of 
meat from a four year-old child.” Regardless of the veracity of these claims, Martínez 
was motivated to purchase an enslaved boy and bartered a young girl in exchange for a 
pot and a frying pan, christening the two as “Estéban” and “María de los Dolores.”26  
 Spaniards involved in the Indigenous slave trade likewise used Christianization as 
a pretense for purchasing enslaved children. As reported by José Mariano Moziño, 
Spaniards had been in the habit of purchasing captives from the Nuu-Chah-Nulth taken in 
previous wars. As Moziño related, “they [the Nuu-Chah-Nulth] sell them [captives] to the 
Spaniards, who have had the generosity to buy them, not in order to keep them in the 
sorry lot of slavery, but in order to educate them as sons and bring them to the bosom of 
the Holy Catholic Church.” Though Moziño did not disclose the number of enslaved 
persons purchased or whether they were in reality freed from their “sorry lot of slavery,” 
the motivation of Christianization as a rationale for this engagement is clear. Alejandro 
Malaspina, in his 1791 expedition to Nootka Sound, claimed that no fewer than twenty 
enslaved children were purchased from Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholders in exchange for 
goods such as copper sheets, rifles, and cloth. These children were ultimately transported 
to San Blas in New Spain, and Malaspina cited the “charity” of a certain Father Don 
Nicolás de Luera in overseeing their “social and Christian instruction” and their baptism, 
likely inducting them into New Spain’s mission system. At the conclusion of his three-
year stay at Nootka in 1792, captain Francisco de Eliza reported that at least fifty-six 
children were purchased by Spaniards at Nootka, Clayoquot, and the Strait of Juan de 
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Fuca in order to transported to Spanish territories in that year.27 Taken together, these 
accounts indicate that during Spain’s brief tenure as an imperial player on the Northwest 
Coast, Spanish agents had a proportionately high level of involvement in the Indigenous 
slave trade given the number of enslaved persons purchased relative to the Native 
population. 
 Though Spaniards were perhaps the most heavily involved group in the period’s 
Indigenous slave trade by the sheer number of captives purchased, they were far from the 
only group involved. In particular, certain American traders from Boston sought to profit 
from the traffic in human bodies unburdened by the pretense of Christianization. One 
such American trader was Captain George Washington Eayers of the ship Mercury, who 
developed an infamous reputation among other Euro-Americans as an unscrupulous 
slaver. On one occasion, Eayers took eleven free Makah men hostage aboard the Mercury 
under the pretense of trading sometime in the early-nineteenth century,28 forcing them to 
hunt for seals down the coast as slaves before abandoning them in California in one of 
several kidnapping incidents for which he became feared. Captain David Nye of the ship 
New Hazard, who was regarded as a “tyrant” by his own crew, was another American 
well-known for his involvement in the slave trade. Active during the first decade of the 
19th century, Nye was known to purchase slaves from one Indigenous group before 
transporting the enslaved for resale to another, turning a profit in the process. On one 
occasion, Nye purchased two slaves from the Nahwitti Kwakwaka’wakw, selling them to 
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Haidas just days later for the price of three otter skins total. John Boit reported in his log 
of the Columbia that the Makah titleholder Tatoosh offered to sell the ship’s crew a 
number of slave children taken in a war (though it is unclear if they were actually 
purchased), and Samuel Furgerson, carpenter of the American brig Otter, alleged that 
Samuel Hill (the ship’s captain) purchased a ten year-old boy from Haidas at Skidegate 
for “fifteen clamons [elk hide armor], four otter skins and two blankets,” likely for resale. 
The actions of these men represented a recurring pattern among American traders. As 
English sailor Peter Corney summarized in his account of trading voyages between 1813-
18, “the slave trade is carried on, on this coast, to a very great extent by the Americans. 
They buy slaves to the southward and take them to the northward, where they exchange 
them for the sea otter and other furs. If they cannot buy slaves cheap, they make no 
scruple to carry them off by force.”29 Exploitation of Indigenous slavery by American 
traders, whether for labor or for profit, evidently occurred on a pervasive scale and 
represented the complex intersections between indigenous captivities and Euro-American 
economies arising from the maritime fur trade. 
One of the more destructive and exploitative forms of slavery to emerge from 
Indigenous-Euro-American encounters was that of forcible prostitution. Although 
prostitution and sexual slavery most likely existed among Northwest Coast societies 
previous to Euro-American colonization given how rapidly the traffic in sexual slavery 
emerged, the practice evolved in both scale and severity during the maritime fur trade. 
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Accounts of prostitution and “immodesty” are abundant in the journals of traders, 
whether English, Spanish, American, or Russian, and although the traders themselves 
often did not remark on whether the women they observed were captives, in many cases 
their unfree status can be inferred. In Noticias de Nutka, Moziño noted the common 
practice of prostitution in the area, claiming that “the taíses [titleholders] themselves 
prostitute these women, especially to foreigners, in order to take advantage of the profit 
earned from this business.” Moziño proceeded to surmise that the women in question 
were the wives of the titleholders themselves.30 Such assumptions were the norm among 
Euro-American commenters on Northwest Coast prostitution, and were buoyed by 
decades of racist thinking in which Indigenous masculinities and femininities were cast as 
“defective.” What is noteworthy about Moziño’s assumptions is that they are directly 
contradicted by the accounts of other (primarily British) colonial agents, who lauded 
upper-class Nuu-Chah-Nulth women for their “modesty” in comparing them to 
Indigenous women of other ethnicities. Such conflicting accounts of Nuu-Chah-Nulth 
women not only highlight the many contradictions central to Euro-American racial and 
cultural thinking, but further indicate the cultural ignorance of many colonial agents, 
ignorance that often obscured the complexities of social life and social status among 
Northwest Coast peoples. Whether or not the women prostitutes Moziño described were 
in fact the wives of prominent titleholders is ultimately impossible to verify, though it is 
highly likely that the women were in fact enslaved, a possibility that appears likelier 
when corroborated with other accounts. 
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One such account came from Alejandro Malaspina’s 1791 voyage to the 
Northwest Coast. In a visit to Russian-claimed territories in Alaska, Spanish sailors 
employed the sexual services of “women [who] were slaves captured in warfare.” Similar 
reports were produced by traders of other nationalities as well. Englishman Alex T. 
Walker, a member of John McKay’s crew, described multiple visits to Maquinna’s 
village at Nootka Sound and to Haida Gwaii, in which he witnessed interactions 
indicative of slavery and its connection to prostitution. In a July entry, Walker claimed 
that Maquinna offered a “wife” to John McKay as a “[pledge] of friendship,” though 
whether the woman in question was one of Maquinna’s relations or an enslaved person is 
unclear. However, this incident provides a contrast to a later one described by Walker 
during a visit to Haida Gwaii in which a woman was offered for sexual services. Though 
Walker did not perceive the woman as being enslaved, she did not possess a labret, an 
adornment used by women in Haida society to signify high rank and nobility.31 The 
absence of a labret indicates that the unnamed woman had no relation to the titleholder 
who offered her, making it likely that she was enslaved, as observed by Robert H. Ruby 
and John A. Brown. A strategy typically employed by titleholders was the arranged 
marriage of female relations to Euro-American men. This practice typically aimed to 
include Euro-American traders in titleholders’ networks of kinship, thus consolidating 
power and working to earn trading privileges. It appears unlikely that offering female 
relatives for sexual services was intended to produce similar results, and despite the racist 
assumptions of Euro-American agents, that titleholders would use their own relatives for 
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this purpose. It is likely, then, that the prostitution described in Euro-American accounts 
involved enslaved women from the titleholder’s own household given the absolute power 
granted to slaveholders. Regardless of the status of female prostitutes, however, the 
provision of sexual services to Euro-Americans produced catastrophic consequences for 
Indigenous societies participating in the maritime fur trade.  
 In the late-eighteenth century, infectious diseases introduced by Euro-Americans 
in the maritime fur trade decimated many Native communities on the Northwest Coast, 
and prostitution catalyzed the spread of these afflictions. Although smallpox was the 
chief culprit in population decline among outer coast groups coinciding with intensive 
contact in the late-eighteenth century maritime fur trade, the spread of venereal diseases 
posed another destructive threat to certain communities in that its influence often 
coincided with European crowd disease epidemics. Though venereal diseases such as 
syphilis may have first been introduced to Vancouver Island by Spanish sailors in the 
1770s, there is compelling evidence to suggest that sailors with the 1778 expedition of 
Captain James Cook were among the first to introduce the epidemic. David Samwell, a 
ship surgeon in Cook’s service, documented the introduction of venereal disease to the 
Hawaiian Islands, and Cook’s men have been implicated in the spread of gonorrhea and 
syphilis throughout the Pacific Basin.32 
 Bound up in these epidemics was the use of captives as prostitutes. Indeed, 
epidemiologist Robert Boyd contends that the Northwest Coast institution of slavery 
“dovetailed nicely with the demographic and mercantile characteristics of the maritime 
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newcomers,” producing a situation “ripe for the spread of venereal disease.” During a 
visit to Nootka Sound, Samwell described the arrival of “two or three girls” aboard 
Cook’s ship for the purposes of prostitution whom he assumed were the female relations 
of local men. However, crew member William Ellis surmised that the women were in 
reality members of an unnamed group that the Mowachaht had “overcome in battle,” thus 
indicating their status as captives. Given the circumstances, as well as Samwell’s 
knowledge of venereal disease among Cook’s crew, it is likely that such epidemics were 
introduced to the Nuu-Chah-Nulth through the prostitution of enslaved women such as 
those described by Ellis. One distinct incident was recorded by trader John Hoskins in 
1791 at the village of Nittenat on southwest Vancouver Island near the Strait of Juan de 
Fuca. Hoskins described the village titleholder “Cassacan” as being “troubled with the 
venereal to a great degree,” further elaborating the circumstances through which he 
became infected. Sometime before Hoskin’s visit, Cassacan had sold a “slave girl” to the 
unnamed captain of a merchant vessel for “several sheets of copper.” However, when the 
ship departed, the enslaved girl in question was sent back ashore and engaged in 
intercourse with Cassacan, shortly after which she passed away. Following this 
interaction, Cassacan contracted an unnamed venereal disease (likely syphilis or 
gonorrhea) and passed it onto his wife, causing serious physical distress to both.33 This 
sequence of events is perhaps one the most clear examples of the connection between the 
spread of venereal disease and sexual slavery involving female captives in the maritime 
fur trade. 
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It is important to note, however, that the spread of venereal disease likewise had 
dangerous implications for Northwest Coast communities in their impairment of human 
reproduction. In The Great Ocean, David Igler writes that in addition to the outright 
death created by diseases such as smallpox in so-called “virgin soil epidemics,” the 
spread of venereal diseases had “catastrophic” consequences for Indigenous communities 
in that they “critically attacked” the ability of infected peoples to reproduce. Venereal 
syphilis and gonorrhea produced “lower birthrates, higher infant mortality, and chronic ill 
health that undermined immune resistance to other introduced pathogens,” creating a 
situation in which affected communities were not only unable to replenish their 
populations but were rendered even more vulnerable to other European-introduced 
diseases. It is noteworthy that Cassacan, the Nittenat titleholder previously mentioned, 
contracted (and miraculously survived) a bout of smallpox sometime after his health was 
eroded by venereal disease, as Hoskins noted during a return visit to the village. Thus the 
example of Cassacan concretely demonstrates the linkages between sexual slavery in the 
maritime fur trade, venereal disease, and subsequent vulnerability to other introduced 
diseases such as smallpox. In the case of communities that enjoyed the most lucrative 
position with Euro-Americans in the early maritime fur trade, the effects of venereal 
disease-induced infertility were far-reaching. This is evident in John Boit’s account. In a 
visit to Clayoquot Sound, Boit remarked that though the community possessed “upwards 
of 3000 souls,” the people of Clayoquot suffered from infertility and that “barrenness 
[was] very common” among the village’s women. During the Columbia’s stay at 
Clayoquot, Robert Gray visited a nearby village and found its chief titleholder severely ill 
and near death with an unnamed illness. The sick titleholder was surrounded by a retinue 
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of eight men who “kept pressing his stomach with their hands,” an action which may 
indicate severe gonorrhea-related complications.34 Taken together, the information 
provided by Boit indicates that the people of Clayoquot were by 1792 severely affected 
by introduced venereal diseases. Given historical knowledge regarding the village’s 
preeminence in the early maritime fur trade as well as intensive slaving activities related 
to Wickaninnish’s consolidation of power, it is likely that there too the relationship 
between the captive economy, sexual slavery in the maritime fur trade, and venereal 
disease combined to produce this devastation.  
Although the exact number of disease-related casualties among Northwest Coast 
Indigenous peoples during the maritime fur trade is difficult to calculate with certainty, 
deaths almost certainly numbered in the thousands. Indeed, Robert Boyd estimates that 
out of a total Northwest Coast population of almost 190,000 in 1770, the population by 
1810 stood between 110 and 120,000, a decline mostly attributable to smallpox.35 As we 
have seen, however, while smallpox was by far the largest killer, it was not the only 
culprit in what amounted to a region-wide demographic catastrophe. The spread of 
venereal diseases such as syphilis and gonorrhea operated in tandem with other crowd 
disease epidemics, producing a volatile situation in which Native communities were less 
able to resist subsequent outbreaks and in which their ability to reproduce and recover 
lost population was inhibited. Captivity in the form of sexual slavery was at the center of 
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this conundrum, and its legacy would have far-reaching implications for Indigenous 
people on the Northwest Coast in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The demographic catastrophes experienced by Indigenous communities on the 
outer coast as a result of sexual slavery were one of the many complications brought 
about by the captivities and violence emerging from the maritime fur trade. Slave raiding, 
“displaced violence,” hostage-taking, and Euro-American involvement in the Indigenous 
slave trade constituted a complex web of related conflicts and captivities unique to the 
circumstances of contact in the maritime fur trade. Indigenous and Euro-American 
societies, each with their own hierarchies and regimes of power, entered into interactions 
in which a high degree of mutual cultural illiteracy and misunderstanding could erupt into 
conflict at any moment. Long before Euro-Americans arrived on the Northwest Coast, 
Indigenous societies were marked by entrenched social stratification in the system of 
rank, a reality which the presence of institutionalized slavery makes abundantly clear. 
The enslaved, as natally-alienated individuals whose stigma carried connotations of non-
personhood, whose status was hereditary, and who were considered as the absolute 
property of their households, formed a stratum whose very presence reified constructions 
(as well as perceptions) of power manifest in Northwest Coast societies. The presence of 
slavery and enslaved people on the Northwest Coast arguably formed a baseline for 
interactions and negotiations of power arising from contact. This is evident in the practice 
of hostage-taking by Euro-Americans in particular. Whether motivated by economic 
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incentives or other impetuses, the taking of titleholders as hostages served to enforce 
Euro-American desires for power in dynamic situations. Furthermore, such actions served 
as temporary inversions of the Indigenous socio-political order, and it is no accident that 
this form of captivity occurred as Euro-Americans observed the presence of slavery in 
Indigenous societies.  
Intra-group interactions between Indigenous peoples during the maritime fur trade 
era likewise included slavery and captivity as a baseline component. The rise to power of 
prominent titleholders such as Wickaninnish and Maquinna, itself a result of shifts 
induced by the trade, saw raiding, violence, and the act of enslavement as pervasive 
routes to dominance in the new economic order. “Displaced violence” stemming from 
imperial influences was further compounded by the material demands and conditions of 
the trade, a reality evident in the introduction of Euro-American firearms and the use of 
conflict as a means by which to continually acquire sea otter pelts and other crucial items 
of trade. While these changes enriched certain communities in the short-term, they 
produced dislocations that eventually proved destructive with the decline of the maritime 
fur trade, and communities such as the Haachats experienced depopulation and 
enslavement as a result of the trade’s economic imperatives. Furthermore, Euro-
American “pedagogic violence” against Indigenous people produced further dislocations 
for communities on the outer coast, as did Euro-American involvement in Native slavery, 
particularly in the form of disease. As such, violence and captivity were pervasive 
features of the maritime fur trade period, features which would further evolve during the 
nineteenth century. 
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III. BURNT FORTS AND BLOODY BAIDARKAS: POLITICS, 
PROFIT, AND CAPTIVES IN ALASKA AT THE TURN OF 
THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Photograph of the Raven Helmet worn by K’alyaan in the 1804 Battle of Sitka as it appeared in the Sheldon 
Jackson Museum in Sitka, Alaska between 1901-1911.36 
 
Passed down by generations of tradition-bearers in the Tlingit Kiks.adi clan of 
Sitka, the helmet above appears remarkably well-preserved despite its age of more than 
two-hundred years. Though its dull copper eyes have lost their gleam over time, their 
presence indicates an item designed for nobility, copper being among the most valuable 
materials in the pre-capitalist Tlingit economy. At first glance, the artifact may appear 
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unassuming, bereft of the ostentatious adornment of a crown. However, the smooth black 
beak and mottled tufts appearing before the contemporary observer in the Sheldon 
Jackson Museum of Sitka, Alaska, is no less regal or lacking in historical importance. 
This helmet, presented in Kiks.adi ceremonies to this day, was carved in the countenance 
of a raven, emblem of one of the two great Tlingit moieties. As Russian colonists fought 
to retake Sitka Sound from rebelling Tlingit forces in 1804, it was worn by K’alyaan, the 
nobleman and war chief of the Kiks.adi under whose leadership the Tlingit clans of 
Southeast Alaska united to expel the Anooshi (Russians) invading Tlingit Country in 
1802. Erupting in the wake of nearly a decade of Russian incursions into Tlingit Country 
which saw widespread exploitation of Tlingit resources and people, the anti-Russian 
uprising of 1802 and the subsequent battle of 1804 represented a pivotal moment in both 
the history of what would become Alaska and the Northwest Coast as a whole. Though 
few in number, the St. Petersburg bureaucrats and Russian-Siberian fur traders 
(promyshlenniki)37 who sailed across the Bering Strait into the fragmented islands and 
fjords of the Alexander Archipelago would fundamentally alter Tlingit country, itself a 
constituent piece of a larger Indigenous North Pacific world.38 
The often-overlooked battles of 1802 and 1804 in which K’alyaan was a key 
organizer may appear at first glance as minor installments in a long procession of 
conflicts between North America’s Indigenous peoples and Euro-American colonizers. 
Far from being marginal, however, these episodes were representative of a world in 
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violent transformation, larger than any one battle, nationality, or individual. At the turn of 
the nineteenth-century, the Indigenous inhabitants of the Northwest Coast found 
themselves ensnared in a matrix of multi-national colonialisms whose galleons and 
sloops plied the Inside Passage. Once unknown to Euro-Americans, by 1800 the 
Northwest Coast played host to colonial processes driven by the unrelenting quest for 
thick, lustrous sea otter pelts in the maritime fur trade. Tlingit Country and much of 
coastal Alaska were no exception. However, in contrast to much of the rest of the 
Northwest Coast, the Indigenous peoples of maritime fur trade-era Alaska contended with 
a unique set of circumstances manifest in the Russian Empire’s distinctive approach to 
colonization in the region via its state monopolies, first with the Golikov-Shelikhov 
Company (SGC) and later the Russian American Company (RAC). Though the tactics 
employed by these companies shared many features with the extractive merchant 
colonialisms of other Euro-American powers on the Northwest Coast, they operated 
under entirely different parameters than the largely independent American and British 
traders active in the region. Russia’s colonial companies attempted to exact absolute 
political subordination to the Empire from Alaska’s Native people, laying claim to their 
bodies, resources, and labor in ways which distinguished Russian methods from other 
Euro-American players. More importantly, however, Russian colonists employed regimes 
of coerced and captive labor in the Native communities they occupied (primarily Aleut 
and Alutiiq peoples), preferring to force Indigenous people to extract valuable resources 
for the companies’ financial benefit. Furthermore, when Russian colonists began their 
push into Southeast Alaska in the late-eighteenth century, they encountered in the 
Tlingits a society in which slavery and captivity were vital components of the 
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socioeconomic order, so much so that Tlingit conceptualizations of slavery became a 
framework through which titleholders interpreted Russian actions and agendas. In this 
setting, Russian and Tlingit captivities collided as the RAC attempted to exploit Tlingit 
Country’s abundant natural wealth, and the resulting conflict was one in which captivity 
was not only an instigating factor, but a tool of negotiation.  
 
 
 
Early Encounters, Captives, and the Creation of “Russian America” 
 
Russian map of the North Pacific and American possessions.39 
 
 The Russian-Tlingit conflicts of 1802 and 1804 were preceded by decades of 
contact and interaction between the two parties as well as the consolidation of a new 
colonial regime in “Russian America.” The first known Tlingit-Russian encounter 
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occurred in 1741 as a result of the so-called Second Kamchatka Expedition led by Vitus 
Bering and Aleksei Chirikov. The expedition made little direct contact with Tlingits, 
though rather infamously, a number of crew members sent ashore off of the coast of 
Southeast Alaska never returned. Chirikov and company assumed that the missing men 
had been killed or taken captive, a notion which animated Russian perceptions of Kolosh 
(Tlingit) “savagery” that would later guide policy. However, Tlingit oral histories suggest 
that the disappeared crew members deserted and were integrated into Tlingit 
communities where they possibly married local women. The next Russian expedition to 
Tlingit country took place in 1783 under the Zaikov Expedition, by which time it would 
not be until the leadership of Grigory Shelikhov, a wealthy and prominent promyshlennik, 
that any serious and concerted Russian push into Southeast Alaska was made, however. 
Under his auspices, the Shelikhov-Golikov Company was created in 1783 for the 
organized exploitation of Alaska’s fur-bearing resources. Shelikhov requested that an 
imperial monopoly be granted to the company only to have the request denied by 
Empress Catherine the Great, though Russian expansion continued.40 
 Following the Second Kamchatka Expedition in the decades leading up to 
Russian expansion into Tlingit country, promyshlenniki and colonial administrators first 
established themselves in the Aleutian and Kodiak Islands. This process was fueled by 
the subjugation of Aleut and Alutiiq peoples in their homelands. Such subjugations were 
characterized by extreme violence as exemplified by the 1784 Awa’uq (or “Refuge 
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Rock”) Massacre, in which 130 promyshlenniki slaughtered some 500 Kodiak Alutiiq 
men, women, and children. Over 1,000 (or 4,000, according to Shelikhov) Kodiaks had 
gathered at a “Refuge Rock,” a type of defensive settlement used by Alutiiqs and Aleuts, 
in resistance to Russian demands for hostages. The promyshlenniki, under Shelikhov’s 
orders, stormed the settlement with rifle and cannon fire, resulting in a bloodbath that was 
perhaps among the largest colonial massacres of Indigenous people in North American 
history. The killings at Awa’uq were devastating to Alutiiq and Aleut resistance, resulting 
in firm Russian control and settlement of Kodiak Island. Furthermore, by Shelikhov’s 
own estimate, almost 1,000 Alutiiq people were taken captive, transported to the 
company post of Three Saints Bay, and forced to work following the incident.41 Indeed, 
Russian violence against the peoples of coastal Alaska was motivated by the fundamental 
impulse to compel Indigenous labor for the company. It was no coincidence that more 
than any other Indigenous group in the American North Pacific, Aleuts and Alutiiqs were 
renowned for their skill and efficiency in hunting sea otters. Armed with spears that were 
particularly well-suited to hunting marine wildlife and sealskin baidarkas (vessels similar 
to kayaks), Aleut and Alutiiq men were trained from boyhood in the skill of sea otter 
hunting, in contrast to promyshlenniki, whose experience was primarily with land-based 
fur trapping. Given this disparity in skills and a context in which marine (rather than 
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land) mammals were the imperative of profit and expansion, securing control over 
Indigenous labor was prioritized by the SGC and later the RAC.42 
 In contrast to Russian colonial ventures in Siberia, where the compulsory fur 
tribute system of the iasak formed the basis of extraction of Indigenous Siberian 
resources, Russian colonists developed a colonial economy around the organization of 
Aleut and Alutiiq men into large hunting teams as partovshchiki, Indigenous hunter-
laborers under the direction of Russian overseers. From the late eighteenth century until 
reforms undertaken by the RAC in 1818, a large proportion of partovshchiki were 
compelled to work in a condition termed kaiurstvo,43 a system in which Indigenous 
individuals were used as uncompensated captive laborers who could be bought, sold, and 
“loaned.” Many kaiury were former slaves of Indigenous individuals “redeemed” by 
Russians through purchase. Aleuts and Alutiiqs could likewise be compelled to work by 
debt peonage, and Indigenous women (aside from the wives of prominent village leaders) 
in areas under Russian control were required to perform menial labor for the companies 
as a general rule. Some partovshchiki were forced to hunt when their family members 
were taken captive as amanaty (hostages) in a practice which generally involved the 
exchange of such hostages (sometimes voluntarily) to maintain peace or accomplish 
negotiations, an approach which had long-standing precedent in the Russian conquest of 
Siberia and was utilized extensively in Alaska. Taken together, Indigenous laborers 
organized under varying degrees of unfreedom were classified by colonial authorities as 
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“dependent natives.” When in 1806 the German-Russian naturalist Georg von Langsdorff 
arrived at the colony, he remarked on the Aleut and Alutiiq laborers interned there as 
“perfect slaves to [the RAC].” Though this comment reads as one informed by 
condescension today, Langsdorff’s observation captured the truth of Russian exploitation 
of Native populations in Alaska. As such, the creation of Russian America and its 
accompanying violence was defined by captivity and the exploitation of unfree 
Indigenous labor through an array of practices, traits which distinguished Russia from 
other Euro-American powers on the Northwest Coast. As historian Gwenn A. Miller 
notes, the Russian system of compulsory labor in Alaska differed markedly from the fur 
trade practices of other Euro-American colonial powers, further stating that the practices 
utilized by Russians in Siberia (particularly relating to captivity) were “grafted” onto the 
Alaskan landscape in ways that allowed the colonizers to adapt and profit from its marine 
environment.44 Taken together, the early success and viability of the Russian-American 
economy was largely predicated on practices of captivity and unfree labor. 
 It was in this context of violent expansion in the Aleutian and Kodiak Islands and 
the accompanying formation of regimes of unfree labor that Russian colonists began their 
first serious push in Southeast Alaska’s Tlingit Country in June of 1792. That year, a 
young Alexander Baranov, then primary director of the Golikov-Shelikhov Company 
(and future governor of the RAC and “Russian America”), undertook an expedition to 
Chugach Bay on the northern edge of Tlingit Country. Accompanied by 300 Alutiiqs and 
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Aleuts, 17 Russians, and 20 Chugach hostages taken to secure compliance from the 
locals, Baranov and his crew set up camp on the night of the 20th. When night fell, the 
camp was caught completely off guard by a seemingly unprovoked Tlingit (probably 
Yakutat) raid. Likely motivated by past transgressions by the Chugach, the Tlingit force 
emerged from the shadows disguised in painted wooden helms described by Baranov as 
“hellish,” charging into the gathered tents with their spears. The promyshlenniki and their 
Native allies fired on the raiders in panic, only for their bullets to glance off of the 
wooden plate armor (kuiak) worn by the attackers. The fight lasted into the early 
morning, when the raiders dispersed following the arrival of Russian reinforcements. By 
the afternoon, eleven of Baranov’s men lay dead and some four of his Chugach hostages 
had been taken captive by the Tlingits.45 Furthermore, when a flotilla commandeered by 
captains E. Purtov and D. Kuliakov again reconnoitered Yakutat Bay in 1794, they 
learned from a chief of the Yakutat that the Chugach captives taken two years previous 
had been sold as slaves “farther than the bay of the Chilkats.”46  As such, one of the first 
expeditions undertaken by Russian colonists to initiate settlement of Southeast Alaska 
was characterized by captive-taking and almost derailed by conflict with Tlingits, 
demonstrating a pattern that would persist in Russian-Tlingit interactions. 
 In 1799, the Russian march southeast resulted in the construction of the first 
Russian settlement on Sitka Sound on the western edge of present-day Baranof Island. 
Just one year prior, the Shelikhov-Golikov Company was reorganized as the Russian 
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American Company (RAC) and granted a state monopoly in Alaska by Tsar Paul II, a 
move that more resembled Western European colonial approaches and was novel for the 
Russian Empire. The initial site, built under the orders of Baranov, then the director of 
the new RAC, is known in historical literature as “Fort Mikhailovskii,” and it included a 
small village as well as a stockade.47 The creation of the settlement was sanctified in a 
ceremony that included a show of military force replete with cannon fire and aided by 
kaiury, an Orthodox Christian procession with a “cross of the saviour,” and the placement 
of a symbolic plate inscribed with the words “Land of Russian Possession.” Though 
locals from Sitka were invited to the event, relations were fraught from the beginning and 
actual Russian possession of the land existed in name only. In a letter to fellow 
administrator Emel’ian Larionov dated July 24, 1800, Baranov outlined various 
difficulties experienced by colonists at Mikhailovskii involving the nearby Tlingits.48 His 
complaints included the open, “shameless” trade in firearms between Natives and English 
and Bostonian traders following Russian attempts to prohibit the use of such weapons by 
Indigenous people. He likewise cited frequent “insults” to Russian authority. One such 
affront according to Baranov was an incident in which he and 22 company personnel 
entered the main Sitkan village armed with cannons after a female interpreter was 
allegedly beaten and robbed by villagers. Baranov and his men found themselves 
surrounded by some 300 Tlingits armed with rifles, and the incident nearly erupted into 
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open conflict.49 In spite of the pomp and pageantry of empire, Fort Mikhailovskii’s first 
year of existence was marked by high tensions with its Tlingit neighbors.  
The fort itself was located several miles north of the main Tlingit village of Sitka. 
Like elsewhere in Tlingit country, political divisions within the village of Sitka were 
complex. Sitkans used (and continue to use) the word kwaan to describe their community 
as a whole. The kwaan of Sitka was itself divided into four main clans, each belonging to 
one of the two great moieties (matrilineal lines) of the Tlingit people, the Ravens and the 
Eagles. At the time of Russian settlement, the four clans of Sitka were the Kaagwaantaan 
and Chookaneidi (belonging to the Eagle moiety), and the L’uknax.adi and Kiks.adi 
(belonging to the Ravens). Of these four, the Kiks.adi were likely the largest and most 
influential given their leading role in the coming conflict, and it was from this clan that 
the two ring leaders of the 1802 rebellion would arise: K’alyaan and Shka’wulyeil.50 
Little is known of either aside from their roles in the uprising and in Tlingit-Russian 
diplomacy, though it is certain that Shka’wulyeil was the maternal uncle of K’alyaan. In 
the matrilineal Tlingit social system, the maternal uncle, rather than the father, functioned 
as the most important male figure and role model for young men and boys (particularly 
among the nobility), thus Shka’wulyeil mentored K’alyaan through boyhood in becoming 
a nobleman and warrior deserving of his rank. As the highest ranked individual of the 
Sitka Kiks.adi, it was Shka’wulyeil’s duty to groom K’alyaan as a successor.51 This 
relationship would prove critical in the coming war against Russians. 
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 There is still some debate as to what ignited the rebellion of the Tlingit coalition 
in 1802. Scholars have cited multiple factors as catalyzing Tlingit grievances into war, 
notably the depletion of Tlingit resources (particularly sea otters) by partovschiki and 
RAC policies which infringed on Tlingit trading practices. It is further worth noting that 
Baranov himself took measures to maintain amicable relations with the Tlingits of Sitka, 
efforts which included specific instructions that company personnel treat the Tlingits with 
greater care than that given to Alutiiqs and Aleuts. Despite such instructions, however, it 
is clear that these efforts were not effective. Russian prohibitions on the sale of firearms 
to Native people as well as the overwhelming dominance of British and American wares 
in the maritime fur trade translated into a Tlingit preference for trade with non-Russian 
Euro-American agents. Indeed, by the early 1790s, Tlingits possessed large numbers of 
western-manufactured firearms, a development which surprised many Euro-American 
observers and illustrated the burgeoning exchange between Tlingit villages and western 
traders. During the heyday of the maritime trade, Tlingit communities on the Pacific side 
of the Alexander Archipelago and their leaders found themselves in a highly lucrative 
position relative to groups further inland as middlemen. The Sitka kwaan, and the 
Kiks.adi clan to which K’alyaan belonged, were one such group whose geography 
allowed them privileged access to seasonal trading vessels.52  
 This trade, of course, was entirely contingent on access to the sea otter pelts 
which foreign sailors so craved. As Russian colonial forces spread southeast from the 
Kodiak Islands and into Tlingit country, this access was imperiled. The bulk of the 
Russian colonial workforce in Alaska, both under the SGC and RAC, was composed of 
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expert Aleut and Alutiiq hunters, with a majority being kaiury or otherwise “dependent” 
laborers. Aleuts and Alutiiqs were well known for their skill and efficiency in hunting sea 
otters, and the RAC deployed large numbers of partovshchiki in Tlingit country as otter 
populations in the Aleutians grew scarce. With the establishment of a permanent Russian 
presence in Tlingit country, first at Yakutat and then at Sitka, came a veritable army of 
skilled sea otter hunters. By 1802, sea otter populations were depleting rapidly all along 
the Northwest coast due to the profit-driven motive of the fur trade along with high 
demand in world markets, and nowhere was this precipitous decline more apparent than 
in Russian Alaska. Competition with skilled Aleut and Alutiiq hunters in the employ of 
the RAC and sea otter population decline jeopardized Tlingit trading relations, a prospect 
which was particularly alarming to coast Tlingit communities such as the Sitkans. 
Historian Andrei Grinev claims that Tlingits were further enraged by the behaviour of 
many partovshchiki, who allegedly plundered Tlingit graves on multiple occasions and 
left large amounts of refuse on Tlingit hunting grounds. Tlingit grievances relating to the 
over-exploitation of the local sea otter population by the RAC would later surface during 
negotiations between the two parties after the 1802 attack.53 
 While disputes between Tlingit communities and the RAC regarding overhunting 
were undoubtedly a major contributing factor to the 1802 uprising, grievances related to 
Russian captivity practices and exploitation of the Tlingit population were likewise 
central to the anti-Russian uprising. In Tlingit oral histories recalling the conflict and its 
lead-up, a recurring grievance is the allegation of Russian abuse of Tlingit women. 
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Andrew P. Johnson, a Kiks.adi elder and tradition-bearer, described incidents in a 1979 
oral interview in which RAC employees ambushed and violated local women in the 
vicinity of Sitka as they gathered berries in the nearby forest.54 Grinev describes Tlingit 
indignation arising from unreciprocated marriages between company employees and the 
daughters of nobles, given that such arrangements required a substantial gift exchange 
between the parties and were viewed as illegitimate and violatory when such standards 
were not met. Tlingit nobles likely regarded Russian failures to reciprocate in such 
marriages as tantamount to a form of slavery imposed on their daughters, and such fears 
were not entirely irrational given the RAC practice of compelling Aleut and Alutiiq 
women to work without compensation. In the years following the establishment of Fort 
Mikhailovskii, Russian colonists further attempted to enforce the system of compelled 
female labor developed in the Aleutians on Tlingits (minus those of high rank), a 
development that only served to further sour relations.55 
 Further damaging Russian-Tlingit relations was the Russian practice of 
“acculturating” Tlingit children, especially those of the nobility. The colonial leadership 
perceived the process of “Russianizing” Tlingit children as not only beneficial for 
Tlingits themselves through the introduction of “civilization,” but further saw this policy 
as potentially beneficial to the company (and the empire) in the long run. According to 
this logic, a new generation of Russianized Tlingit children would promote acquiescence 
to the empire and help to spread Russian hegemony. In such cases, Tlingit children were 
transported to the de facto RAC headquarters at Kodiak (generally with the initial consent 
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of their families), where they were taught “Russian ways” in the form of Orthodox 
religious instruction as well as to read and write. In addition to such exercises, however, 
was the Russian practice of compelling Tlingit children at Kodiak to perform menial 
labor and chores. This aspect of “acculturation” was interpreted by Tlingits as a form of 
slavery. Indeed, Johnson states in his history of the Sitka conflict that Tlingits generally 
viewed the RAC as desiring the Tlingits to “serve them.” This view is corroborated by 
Grinev, who argues that due to flawed translations and the non-existence of terms such as 
“empire” or “autocracy” in the Tlingit language, many Tlingits understood Russian 
attempts to enforce sovereignty over their people as demonstrating the intent to enslave 
them.56 As such, captivity and slavery were central not only to the Russian economic 
strategies that jeopardized Tlingit trade interests, but further lay at the heart of Tlingit 
conceptualizations of the Russian presence.  
 In addition to these widespread grievances, a number of events are described as 
having been the “last straw,” the spark to ignite the eruption. According to Grinev, two 
possible reasons for the final break in Russian-Tlingit relations were the 1801 murder of a 
chief from the Kuiu-Kake community and his family by partovshchiki and the 
imprisonment of a Kootznahoo village chief’s nephew for a minor offense. Other 
explanations focus on the role played by Stoonook, an influential Kaagwaantaan shaman 
from Sitka. According to Tlingit oral histories, Stoonook traveled to the nearby village of 
Klukwan to visit with other relatives of his clan. While eating dinner, an unnamed young 
man allegedly insulted Stoonook by vulgarly mocking the integrity of the Sitka 
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Kaagwaantaan, stating that Sitkans were “dominated” by their Russian occupiers in what 
may have been a bid to provoke Sitka into taking action against the invaders. Such an 
insult to an individual of Stoonook’s rank could not go ignored. Stoonook immediately 
returned to Sitka, where he relayed what had been said to Sitkan leaders of other clans, 
including K’alyaan and Shk’awulyeil. Another, more controversial immediate cause for 
the uprising also emerges in Tlingit oral accounts. An unnamed Kiks.adi nobleman was 
allegedly invited to dine in Fort Mikhailovskii for giving alms to an old, ostracized 
Russian man from the village. The nobleman fell ill while eating, and the Russian hosts 
subsequently revealed that the old Russian man had died and that they had fed their 
Kiks.adi guest slices of his thighs as a cruel “joke.” While this account may strike the 
reader as outlandish, it is recurrent in Tlingit histories of the uprising. Given the extreme 
taboo associated with cannibalism in Tlingit culture, and that such a grievous insult was 
delivered to a nobleman no less, this incident is said to have produced an uproar. Word 
spread among the houses of Kiks.adi and to the other clans of the area, and thus a 
meeting was convened.  K’alyaan called for his war helmet, and when a decision was 
reached, leaders of all the houses stomped and kicked at the fire they stood around in a 
symbolic display of rage.57 They then issued the following declaration: “The Russians 
have now gone far enough. We are not animals. We are not savages, to eat our own flesh. 
We declare war.”58 This statement has been variously attributed to either K’alyaan or 
Shk’awulyeil. Regardless of which of the two said it, the uncle and nephew in that 
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moment became co-leaders in a nascent uprising that would involve the majority of 
Tlingit kwaans in Southeast Alaska as well as some non-Tlingits. What occurred next 
would have repercussions not only for Tlingit country and the RAC, but for the changing 
political, economic, and social fabric of the Northwest Coast as well.  
 
The Battles of Sitka: Conflict and Captivity 
 
RAC fort of Novo Arkhangelsk circa 1805. The fort was built as a replacement for Mikhailovskii following 
the Russian recovery of Sitka in 1804. It was built further south of the original settlement on top of Noow 
Tlein (“Castle Hill”), the site of the main village of the Sitka Tlingit.59 
 
In late June, 1802, Fort Mikhailovskii and Sitka Sound likely appeared as similar 
to the image above. The cold currents of its natural North Pacific harbor are peppered 
with small islets, themselves splinters of the larger islands of the intricate Alexander 
Archipelago. Rugged mountains rise abruptly from the shoreline, standing guard over the 
promontories and peninsulas below. To visitors approaching the site by water in June 
1802, the settlement must have appeared as a huddled mass of wooden homes and 
palisades dwarfed against a wall of evergreen forest. Perhaps chattering and sounds of 
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labor hummed over the harbor as smoke slipped into the sky. Perhaps the omnipresent 
smell of salmon wafted through the maze of wooden planks as Tlingit women preserved 
the season’s catch and a party of partovschiki set out in their seal skin baidarkas in search 
of “soft gold.” By late afternoon, however ashes would fill the air.60 
At midday in early June (the exact date remains unclear), the Tlingit resistance 
forces under K’alyaan and Shk’awulyeil laid siege to Fort Mikhailovskii. By all accounts, 
the attack came as a surprise to those living in the settlement. Abrosim Plotnikov, a 
promyshlennik resident at the settlement on the day of the attack, describes the 1802 siege 
at Sitka with great detail in his 1805 testimony. That day61 Plotnikov went to a nearby 
stream to inspect company cattle. The bulk of the fort’s male employees and 
partovshchiki had departed with captain Ivan Urbanov on a hunt for sea otters the 
previous day, and the twenty armed Russian personnel who remained, like Plotnikov, 
were entirely unprepared for what was about to occur. Upon returning to the settlement, 
he found himself staring at an army of almost fifteen-hundred Tlingit fighters,62 arrayed 
in painted faces and fearsome wooden masks. A fleet of some sixty-two war canoes filled 
the harbor as Shk’awulyeil barked orders from a nearby hill. Following a scuffle with 
four Tlingit warriors in the village farm, Plotnikov slipped out of a window. To his 
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horror, he saw the fort engulfed in seething fire.63 As the blaze spewed ash into the sky, 
the attackers tossed sea otter skins and other company wares from the balcony to readied 
canoes below.64 Such goods were not the only plunder that the attackers would depart 
with. 
 To Pinnuin Katerina, Alutiiq wife of colonist and promyshlennik Zakhar Lebedev, 
the day seemed mundane as any other. With little warning, the encroaching Tlingit army 
fired their rifles into the main fort garrison, shattering its shutters and reducing the 
windows to splinters. In their desperation, the defenders thundered cannons at their 
adversaries, but the Tlingit forces further battered their way inside. In the commotion, fire 
swept the facility as the women and children of the settlement, mostly Aleuts, Alutiiqs, 
and creoles (individuals of mixed Russian-Indigenous ancestry), hid in the cellar. Again, 
Russian cannon fire cracked a deafening roar in the cacophony as Katerina and others 
clambered out of the basement and into the hazy open. There, under a curtain of smoke 
and the flickering glow of fire, they were taken captive and huddled into departing 
canoes. For fifteen days, Katerina was held as a slave, a fate some 27 other denizens of 
Fort Mikhailovskii also met.65 
 When the smoke cleared and the Tlingit attackers departed the smoldering pile of 
embers that remained of the fort, the corpses of twenty Russian defenders lay mangled in 
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the ashes and those who survived had scattered into the nearby forest. A similar fate 
befell the Urbanov party, whose departure previous to the siege was taken advantage of 
by the attackers. K.T. Khlebnikov, an RAC administrator and close associate of Baranov, 
in providing a historical overview of initial Russian settlements in Tlingit country, states 
that on the evening previous to the attack, Urbanov’s party set up camp near Bucareli 
Bay. Shortly after most of the partovshchiki had fallen asleep, a large force of Kake-Kuiu 
Tlingits quietly emerged from the dark, misty forest and raided the camp, leaving the 
assembled tents and baidarkas tattered and bloody. Urbanov himself was taken prisoner, 
but managed to escape his captors along with another captive. Both fled to the nearby 
forest where another seven Aleut survivors joined them. Between the raid on Urbanov’s 
party and the siege of Sitka, 165 Alutiiq and Aleut men lay dead along with 25 Russians. 
By Khlebnikov’s estimate, only 42 of Mikhailovskii’s more than 200 inhabitants 
survived, 28 of whom were taken captive.66 The fate of these captives resulted in a 
dramatic sequence of events emblematic of the complex role played by captivity in the 
colonial context of the Northwest Coast. 
 
 
An artistic rendition of the 1804 Battle of Sitka. K’alyaan is at the forefront, armed with the blacksmith’s 
hammer he attained in 1802 and wearing his raven helmet.67 
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  Pinnuin Katerina, one of the twenty-eight people taken in the attack, provided 
one of the few narratives about the captives’ ordeal. In the fifteen days she spent as a 
slave of the Tlingit rebels, Katerina reported being moved initially to a nearby winter 
village (most likely that of the Kiks.adi) along with the other captives. Upon hearing 
rumor of a Russian dispatch from Kodiak on its way to the area, a party of Tlingit men 
departed to counter the force, only to return two days later having seen no combat but 
hearing word of the fate of the Urbanov party. After seeing what appeared to be a ship 
sailing in the distance, Katerina and the other captives were shuffled from village to 
village by Tlingit women, whom Katerina said were fearful of losing the clan’s new 
slaves. However, at the end of her second week in captivity, Katerina, a kaiurka by the 
name of Ul’iana, and a third woman, along with fifty otter pelts looted from 
Mikhailovskii, were unexpectedly taken to an English ship over several days between 
July 12-17, almost two weeks after the attack at Mikhailovskii, and exchanged for a 
Tlingit man previously taken hostage by the ship’s crew.68 
 The ship in question was the Unicorn, captained by Henry Barber, a veteran of the 
maritime trade. One of the first records of the incident appeared in the May 29, 1803 
publication of the Australian paper the Sydney Gazette, providing a brief account of the 
events of 1802. However, on November 18 1804 the Gazette published a longer extract 
from Barber’s journal of the Unicorn. By his account, Barber and his crew were in the 
vicinity of Sitka on June 28 and were unable to locate the Russian fort. Upon returning to 
the Unicorn following a reconnaissance mission on the 30th, Barber found a local Tlingit 
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nobleman, three American deserters, and a Russian captive who had previously boarded 
the ship in his absence. The American deserters informed the crew of the attack on Sitka, 
claiming that the Tlingits had forced them to participate, as well as estimating that 
upwards of 4,000 otter skins were looted during the siege. On July 1, the Unicorn 
anchored further up Sitka Sound, where Barber encountered the gruesome remains of 
Fort Mikhailovskii and learned of the captives held nearby. In his telling, Barber claims 
to have resolved to rescue the prisoners by any means possible.69 
After taking a number of nearby survivors aboard the Unicorn beginning on the 
4th, on the 6th, Barber invited the previously mentioned American deserters and the 
Tlingit chief on board some days after they had returned to the chief’s village, taking the 
latter and one of his attendants (possibly a slave) hostage and demanding that he turn 
over the “Russian” captives. On the 7th, two unnamed “Russian” (likely creole) women 
were turned over by the Tlingit, and on the 9th, the American vessels Globe and Alert 
entered the sound. Captains John Ebbers and William Cunningham agreed to cooperate 
with Barber, and that same day, the crews of all three ships launched an attack on the 
assemblage of Tlingit canoes that had gathered in the harbor to trade, killing a “number” 
of men, and taking seven Tlingits hostage, including the wife of a chief. On July 11, an 
unnamed Tlingit chief (likely Shk’awulyeil) was “tried” and executed aboard the Globe, 
and several “Russian” women (including Katerina) were exchanged with the Tlingits 
between the 12th and 17th. Finally, on the morning of the 19th, a flotilla of Tlingit canoes 
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arrived alongside the Unicorn and traded thirteen captives for a chief and his wife, 
presumably releasing the additional Tlingit captives as well.70 According to Barber, the 
Unicorn departed Sitka for Kodiak on July 22 with eight men, seventeen women, and 
three children (twenty-eight persons total) who had been captured at Mikhailovskii 
almost a month earlier, capping off roughly two weeks of negotiations.71 
Though Barber describes his intent to recover the Sitka captives in 1802 as being 
motivated by humanitarianism, his account leaves out key facts that cast doubt on the 
heroic image he created for himself. According to Khlebnikov, when the Unicorn arrived 
at Kodiak on July 24, 1802, Barber, rather than immediately freeing the 28 captives, 
anchored off the shore of the Russian settlement and displayed his twenty cannons and 
armed men. Barber announced that although his nation and Russia were at war, he had 
brought the Sitka survivors for ransom out of “humanity,” proceeding to demand fifty-
thousand rubles in cash or furs in exchange for the captives. Though Khlebnikov and 
Barber’s accounts contain discrepancies regarding the latter’s motivations, both accounts 
make clear that the twenty-eight captives were indeed delivered to Russian hands at 
Kodiak. Despite Barber’s bravado, however, Baranov stood his ground during 
negotiations at Kodiak. Ultimately, Barber received only ten-thousand rubles worth of 
furs in exchange for all 28 prisoners.72 Barber’s rationale for settling for a ransom less 
than that which initially demanded remains unclear, although he undoubtedly profited 
handsomely from the exchange given the high global demand for sea otter pelts.  
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What then does one make of Henry Barber, whom Andrei Grinev refers to as 
having earned a reputation as a “base pirate and cunning slave trader” in Soviet and 
Russian historical literature? Some, such as Tlingit experts Nora and Richard 
Dauenhauer, speculate that Barber may have in fact intentionally instigated the 1802 
siege of Sitka himself after selling arms and gunpowder to Natives in the area. According 
to this logic, Barber was possibly motivated by a desire to undermine the Russian 
position on the Northwest Coast in order to advance the position of British colonials in 
the North Pacific market. Grinev, however, argues that Barber was most likely not 
responsible for instigating the rebellion, claiming that Cunningham was a likelier culprit. 
Regardless of whether or not colonial agents did in fact conspire to instigate the Tlingit 
attack, it is important to remember that Tlingits had ample reason to rise up against the 
Russian occupiers on their own terms. Were Barber actually in league with the 
conspirators, however, it is possible that his motivations were largely economic in nature 
and that he had planned from the outset to doublecross K’alyaan and Shk’awulyeil in 
order to personally profit from the razing of Fort Mikhailovskii. It is likewise possible 
that Barber acted out of opportunism and simply took advantage of a volatile situation. 
Indeed, Khlebnikov claims that Barber had by that time developed a reputation for 
trading in captives and utilizing the practice of hostage-taking to further his own ends and 
profit economically. Though it is apparent that American captains were more active in the 
trafficking of captives in the maritime trade era (correlating with the economic 
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dominance of Americans in the period at large), Barber stands out as one of the more 
dramatic examples of Euro-American involvement in these practices.73 
Henry Barber, much like the violent Northwest Coast colonial context in which he 
operated in 1802, is representative of region-wide changes which fundamentally altered 
the economic, political, and social landscape of the Northwest Coast. Such shifts began in 
the earliest phases of the maritime fur trade and were largely solidified by the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Much like other agents of the fur trade, whether colonial or Native, 
Barber utilized captivity, whether in the trafficking of slaves or hostages, as a mechanism 
by which to achieve political and economic ends in a maritime Northwest Coast world 
increasingly defined by violence and uncertainty. In the case of the 1802 Sitka conflict, 
Barber opportunistically co-opted the captivities which had come characterize 
confrontations between Russians and Tlingits as well as Indigenous-Euro-American 
encounters across the Northwest Coast at large. Furthermore, given the numerous Tlingit 
grievances (including disputes related to Russian captivity practices), the campaign to 
expel the Anooshi from Tlingit country was unprecedented in that it united the majority 
of Southeast Alaska’s Tlingit kwaans against a common foreign enemy. Given the highly 
decentralized, complex socio-political organization of Tlingit country as well as the very 
real history of internecine warfare between individual Tlingit clans and villages, the 1802 
uprising was a momentous event in Tlingit political history. The effective unification of 
much of Tlingit country for a common cause is in itself indicative of the radical changes 
colonialism brought to the Indigenous social landscape. Furthermore, the realities of 
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Russian and Indigenous captivities within this colonial context were fundamentally 
interwoven with this process. 
Following the devastation wrought at Sitka and the ensuing standoff with Henry 
Barber, Baranov, among other Russian officials and survivors of the attack, regrouped at 
Kodiak. The siege of 1802 had extreme material and political consequences for the RAC 
in the loss of profits, property and personnel. Indeed, between the razing of Sitka and the 
massacre of the Urbanov party, the RAC lost close to two hundred Russians and 
“dependent” Native workers. The four thousand pelts and other goods looted from Fort 
Mikhailovskii were never recovered, a number of captives taken from the fort and from 
the Urbanov party never returned, and the ransom organized between Barber and 
Baranov were each blows to the company in their own right. Nevertheless, plans to retake 
Sitka commenced shortly after the dust settled, though it would be another two years 
before the RAC again established themselves in Tlingit country. The length of this 
interlude was determined in part by the multiple setbacks described, but as Ilya 
Vinkovetsky argues, Baranov and other RAC administrators feared a Native revolt in 
Kodiak. The conditions imposed by the company on Aleuts and Alutiiqs under its 
jurisdiction, kaiur slavery and debt peonage among them, were arguably harsher than the 
various Russian depredations against Tlingits, and Baranov had plenty reason to fear a 
further deterioration of power during this moment of vulnerability. According to this 
logic, any immediate attempt to reassert a Russian presence at Sitka could have possibly 
drained scarce resources in such a way that the RAC would be rendered vulnerable to 
further Indigenous revolts. Such a threat never materialized, however, and in September 
1804, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the sloop Neva captained by Yuri 
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Lisianskii finally allowed Baranov the resources and opportunity to retaliate against the 
1802 attackers.74  
Lisianskii, under whose leadership the Neva accomplished one of the first Russian 
circumnavigations of the earth, provides a highly detailed account of the 1804 Battle of 
Sitka and subsequent negotiations between the RAC and Tlingit leaders.  On September 
19, Lisianskii and the Neva rendezvoused with Baranov and the crew of the ship Ermank 
near Sitka in the midst of cold, wet squalls and fog. Baranov, who had spent the previous 
months preparing a force for the recapture of Sitka, brought news that most Tlingit 
settlements in the area had dispersed and that his crew destroyed and looted a number of 
villages belonging to the Kake-Kuiu along the way, ostensibly to exact revenge for the 
massacre of Urbanov’s party in what amounted to the first of many acts of violence to 
accompany the Russian counter-offensive. On September 24, Lisianskii and Baranov’s 
party arrived on Sitka Island, where hundreds of mostly Indigenous employees of the 
RAC and their families set about erecting tents, cooking, and laughing over fires 
flickering in the commotion as scores of baidarkas beached. On September 28, Baranov’s 
company began to gradually mobilize for its assault on Sitka as the chants of Tlingit 
shamans carried across the forests and waters of the sound under nightfall. The following 
morning, RAC forces approached the main Tlingit settlement, by which time the Tlingits 
had abandoned in anticipation of the Russian invasion and withdrawan to a fortification 
known as Shiksi Noow (“Sapling Fort”), constructed in 1802 following the destruction of 
Mikhailovskii. Baranov and a party of armed men scaled a prominent nearby hill known 
to Tlingits as Noow Tlein (“Castle Hill”). There, he raised a flag for the Russian Empire 
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on the site where the new fort of Novo Arkhangel’sk would later stand. From Castle Hill, 
the RAC began its push against the Sitka Tlingit.75 
As Baranov’s forces began to mobilize from their base at Castle Hill, the Tlingit 
forces under K’alyaan in turn prepared for a lengthy siege of Shiksi Noow. Key to the 
Tlingit defense strategy was continued access to gunpowder. Indeed, Shiksi Noow was 
equipped with a high palisade topped with falconets and was constructed in such a way as 
to be highly defensible so long as its occupants had ample stores of gunpowder to power 
the fort’s guns. As the Russian forces encroached, the fort’s Sitkan defenders dispatched 
a large canoe to a cave near Kootznahoo to obtain reserve gunpowder in preparation for 
the coming siege. On its return voyage, the canoe was sighted, and after a firefight with 
the crew of the Neva under Lisianskii’s orders, a stray bullet struck the canoe and 
triggered an explosion which destroyed the Sitkans’ gunpowder reserves. This incident 
was of critical significance to the defenders. A number of young noblemen representing 
the houses of Kiks.adi were killed in the blast (three, according to Johnson), some six to 
seven of the wounded were taken captive (two later died), and the gunpowder supply of 
Shiksi Noow was not replenished in time for the impending Russian siege. Furthermore, 
four to five surviving captives taken following the explosion were transported to Kodiak, 
where, under Baranov’s direct orders, they were to be employed “just as Aleut workers,” 
that is to say, as kauiry. The inadequate supply of gunpowder in the fort would prove to 
be a key reason for Tlingit defeat in 1804.76  
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On September 30, the Tlingit defenders, realizing the difficulty of their situation, 
entered into one of a series of negotiations with the Russians, offering a sea otter pelt as a 
symbol of good will and offering one of their own as a hostage. Baranov demanded that 
the Tlingits deliver at least two high-ranking hostages as amanaty as well as turn over a 
number of Aleuts and Alutiiqs previously taken captive. The Tlingit representatives 
refused these terms and negotiations fell apart. On October 1, Lisianskii’s forces further 
encroached upon Shiksi Noow, initiating an exchange of fire between the Russians and 
the Tlingit defenders, and on October 2, Lisianskii attempted to organize another 
exchange of captives, a demand to which an unnamed Tlingit chief offered his grandson 
as amanaty to ensure that the demand would be met the following day. On October 3, the 
Sitkans remaining in the fort raised a white flag and sent nine Aleut captives to the 
Russian side. According to Lisianskii, this number did not amount to the total captives 
held in the fort, and the Neva continued its fire.77 As such, the siege of Shiksi Noow 
continued, marked by periodic negotiations between the two sides in which the status of 
captives assumed a paramount role. 
Tlingit oral histories also narrate the siege of Shiksi Noow and its accompanying 
negotiations. In his paper focusing on the Battle of 1804 from the Kiks.adi oral history 
perspective, Herb Hope states that though the Sitkan defenders were decisively opposed 
to surrendering (an act which they believed would lead to their enslavement), conditions 
within the fort grew dire as already scarce supplies of gunpowder ran dry. In order to buy 
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time, Kiks.adi leaders offered a truce and exchanged hostages while holding out on a 
surrender, information which corroborates Lisianskii’s account of the bombardment. 
According to Hope, as the Tlingit defenders and Russians continued to hold sporadic 
negotiations in which the status of captives on both sides was used as a bargaining chip, 
the Tlingit leadership in Shiksi Noow began to prepare for an evacuation, noting that the 
fort did not have the resources to sustain a defense and fearing that the fort’s inhabitants 
would be starved out. The evacuation of Shiksi Noow’s most vulnerable (including 
children and the elderly) soon began in earnest in what Tlingit histories now recount as 
the “Kiks.adi Survival March,” the mass migration of Sitkans to the safety of nearby 
forests and Tlingit villages in which many died. This evacuation apparently came to form 
part of continued peace negotiations with Russians, as both Lisianskii and Khlebnikov 
state that from October 4 to 7, an indiscernible number of amanaty, including Kodiak 
Aleuts and Tlingit men, were exchanged until the two parties reached an agreement 
whereby the Kiks.adi agreed to finalize their vacation of Shiksi Noow. Hope recounts that 
the Kiks.adi arranged a special signal to indicate their readiness to leave as the remaining 
elders thanked the warriors for defending their home. Those clan members left sang a 
final song in Shiksi Noow, one of grief in the face of defeat at the hands of a terrible 
enemy before departing, most likely on the 7th. Lisianskii and his men entered the empty 
fort, where they looted the most valuable goods left behind by the Kiks.adi and set the 
rest ablaze.78 As such, Shiksi Noow fell to the invaders and the Tlingit resistance 
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movement began to disintegrate after a sequence of events in which captivity functioned 
as a critical tool of negotiation. 
After the flight of the Kiks.adi in October 1804, it was not until 1805 that 
Baranov and the RAC brokered an official (and final) peace with the Tlingit clans of the 
area. Most of the Kiks.adi in exile took refuge with the Tlingits of Angoon, with whom 
they possessed extensive marital ties. With the approval of the Angoon, the Kiks.adi, led 
by K’alyaan, established themselves at an abandoned fort by the name of 
Chaatlk’aanoow within the vicinity of Fort Craven. From this strategic position, they 
imposed a blockade on the village of Sitka to starve the Russians out. Over the next year, 
negotiations between Russians, the Kiks.adi, and other rebelling Tlingit clans continued, 
and the exchange of amanaty proved critical to securing peace and the eventual return of 
the Kiks.adi and other Sitkan exiles. The process included negotiations between 
individual Tlingit kwaans and clans. Lisianskii describes the reception of a prominent 
Sitkan chief on July 16, 1805, in a lavish ceremony at the new Russian settlement of 
Novo Arkhangel’sk. After bestowing a requisite gift on the leader, whose eldest son had 
previously been taken hostage, he agreed to peace terms on the condition that he be 
allowed to return home with his elder son in exchange for his youngest. Soon after, 
K’alyaan himself was received by Baranov, and Russian-Tlingit relations transitioned 
into what Grinev describes as a “cold war.”79 As such, the Sitka conflict, one 
characterized by captivity, was likewise ended through captivity. 
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Despite Russian reclamation of Sitka, construction of Novo Arkhangelsk in 1804, 
and the subsequent brokering of peace with the Sitkan rebels, the status quo had not 
returned. The conflict of 1802-1804 had profound consequences. In burning Fort 
Mikhailovskii, stripping the compound of its resources, and killing almost 200 Russian 
and Indigenous employees in the process, K’alyaan and his army dealt a crippling blow 
to operations in Russian Alaska. In addition to the obvious infliction of financial and 
human damages, the Battles of Sitka ultimately curtailed Russian prospects for expansion 
along North America’s Pacific Coast. Though they defeated the Tlingit rebels and 
reestablished a Russian presence at Sitka, Baranov and the RAC had effectively 
discovered the limits of their ability to consolidate power in the region. The Russian-
Tlingit “cold war” described by Andrei Grinev serves as an indication that although the 
RAC succeeded in reversing the loss of Sitka, diminished resources and the possibility of 
further conflict with the more numerous Tlingit kwaans effectively froze any further 
extensions of Russian power in Southeast Alaska. Indeed, Russian claim to the region 
existed more in name than in reality and effective Russian control extended no further 
than the immediate vicinity of settlements such as Novo Arkhangel’sk. This conundrum 
was little helped by a similar Tlingit revolt at Yakutat in 1805 that required yet another 
diversion of resources, and the new order ushered in by the peace at Sitka essentially 
hobbled the company’s ambitions for an American empire. As such, though Baranov was 
successful in re-asserting an RAC presence in Southeast Alaska, Russian America would 
enter a period of protracted decline culminating in the colony’s sale to the United States 
in 1867. The Tlingit rebellion, Battles of 1802-4, and the ensuing “cold war” not only 
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served as turning points in this decline but were closely bound with the practice and 
peculiarities of captivity in “Russian America.” 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
K’alyaan and his wife c. 1818.80 
 
Only one contemporary image of the Tlingit leader K’alyaan is known to exist. 
Painted in 1818 by Mikhail Tikhanov, the depiction above conveys a regal essence. The 
new Russian fort (and colonial capital) of Novo Arkhangelsk, ringed by rugged 
mountains soaring suddenly from the sea, looms in the background as K’alyaan sternly 
stares ahead. His face is marked by a carefully-groomed goatee indicative of his high 
rank in much the same way as the ornate chilkat blanket draped over his shoulders, a 
luxury item available only to a person of power.  
 By 1818, nearly sixteen years after the siege of Sitka, the socio-political landscape 
of Tlingit country had shifted, a change that likewise affected K’alyaan and the Kiks.adi. 
Following peace negotiations between the RAC and the rebelling Tlingit clans in 1805, 
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K’alyaan’s political position changed from one of confrontation to wary conciliation. 
Tikhanov’s portrait depicts a silver medallion dangling above K’alyaan’s chest, an item 
bestowed upon the leader by Baranov as a “profession of friendship” and a reward for 
cooperation with the RAC in the aftermath of the conflict. It would be unfair, however, to 
describe K’alyaan as a turncoat in the aftermath of the conflict. Beyond the obvious role 
he played in recalibrating the colonial contest for space in the American North Pacific, 
K’alyaan exemplified the negotiations Indigenous leaders and groups undertook to 
navigate and control a violent landscape in transformation. Like other areas of the Pacific 
Northwest Coast in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, Tlingit country and 
its leaders found itself in the midst of rapid economic, social, and political change 
instigated by Euro-American colonial activities and the maritime fur trade. Unlike other 
regions, however, colonialism in Tlingit country was distinguished by the distinctive 
approach undertaken by Russian agents in the Golikov-Shelikov Company and Russian 
American Company towards establishing formal presence and control for the Russian 
Empire. This approach was characterized by the organized, intensive exploitation of 
largely unfree Aleut and Alutiiq labor for the purpose of gathering profitable sea otter 
pelts for international markets. The process of consolidating control over the Aleutian 
and Kodiak Islands was one of intense violence in which captivity practices such as 
kaiurstvo and the use of amanaty were central. The subsequent Russian push into Tlingit 
country under Baranov’s leadership further provoked conflict through the extermination 
of sea otter populations using unfree labor, similar actions which infringed on Tlingit 
sovereignty, and the imposition of practices which Tlingits perceived as measures to 
reduce them to slavery, a system with which they themselves were intimately familiar.  
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When this volatile political landscape erupted into open conflict in 1802, captivity 
would again shape its aftermath and resolution. There is a peculiar irony that in 
attempting to “save” the almost thirty individuals (some of whom were kaiury) enslaved 
following the destruction of Fort Mikhailovskii, Henry Barber, himself no stranger to 
human trafficking, took captive several of the Tlingit captors in order to subsequently 
ransom the survivors to Baranov. However, the Barber incident effectively demonstrates 
the varying and central roles played by European and Indigenous captivities in the violent 
and changing political landscape of the Northwest Coast. Not only could captivity create 
conflict along with economic change but could be further used to resolve conflicts as 
evidenced by the centrality of hostages in peace negotiations between Tlingits and the 
RAC. The use of amanaty was further utilized by Russians to maintain that peace in the 
years following the conflict at Sitka much like in the Aleutians and Kodiaks, though they 
would never exercise unilateral control in Tlingit country despite re-establishing a 
presence in Tlingit country and the 1802-4 uprising fundamentally hobbled Russian 
ambitions for empire on the Pacific Coast of America at a time when British and 
American agents were successfully expanding their influence. The Sitka conflict of 1802-
1804 thus exemplified and was a product of the widespread transformations wrought on 
the Pacific Northwest Coast by Euro-American colonialisms, processes in which 
captivity and unfree labor were central, both in the Russian colonial advance and the 
Tlingit response.  
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IV. EXTINCTION AND EXPANSION: RAIDERS, CAPTIVES, 
AND THE RISE OF THE HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY IN A 
CHANGING INDIGENOUS LANDSCAPE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Frank Allen and his wife Lucy, c. 1930.81 
 
In 1940, a young ethnologist by the name of William Elmendorf received funding 
from the University of California Berkeley to conduct field research in Washington state. 
That summer, he conducted a series of interviews with Frank Allen, an elderly 
Skokomish (Twana) informant. Born in 1858, Allen came of age during an era of rapid 
and tumultuous change for Indigenous people on the Northwest Coast. By the late 
nineteenth-century, Euro-American settlement was well underway in what would become 
Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska, and Native communities, already rattled by 
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decades of colonial violence, rapidly found themselves both adapting and struggling to 
retain their cultures. Frank Allen personally bore witness to this change, but moreover, he 
inherited a history of the change that preceded him. Himself a member of a prominent 
family of titleholders, Allen learned the histories of his people as befitted a man of his 
ancestry. In 1940, he would share a wealth of stories with Elmendorf. Of all the stories 
Allen told, however, one in particular stood out. According to Allen, sometime in the 
mid-nineteenth century the Coast Salish peoples of Puget Sound united to make war 
against the Lekwiltok, a grouping of the southernmost Kwakwaka’wakw peoples, in 
retribution for decades of violence and slave raiding. As Allen described the 
situation,“They [Lekwiltoks] took many women and slaves from all the people around 
here, and at last everybody got tired of those [Lekwiltok] coming and raiding them.”82 
Frank Allen’s narrative is one of many oral histories describing a great war 
against the Lekwiltok in which the majority Coast Salish peoples and villages united to 
exact vengeance on a common enemy. In their analysis of this conflict, anthropologists 
Bill Angelbeck and Eric McLay refer to twenty-one Coast Salish accounts (including 
Frank Allen’s), a confrontation which they dub “The Battle of Maple Bay” in reference to 
the waterway on Vancouver Island where it most likely took place. The battle culminated 
in a decisive Lekwiltok defeat and was characterized by an unprecedented alliance 
between autonomous Coast Salish villages. Although it has since faded into relative 
historical obscurity, the conflict as described by Frank Allen was representative of a 
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world in violent transformation.83 This transformation involved multiple factors. Among 
these were the near extermination of the sea otter which contributed to the gradual 
decline of the maritime fur trade and the eventual shift to a fur trade centered on land. 
This shift ultimately produced a highly complex, volatile change in Indigenous political 
economies, of which Lekwiltok violence against Coast Salish communities during the 
19th century was a symptom. Another was the growth and metamorphosis of the practice 
of Indigenous slavery as an essential feature of native social, political, and economic 
landscapes on the Northwest Coast. The trade in European manufactures that began 
during the period of the maritime fur trade fundamentally altered existing Native 
practices, politics, and trade routes, amplifying pre-existing patterns of violence and 
making slavery more crucial, as well as more profitable, to Indigenous political 
economies.  
 This chapter will analyze the economic, political, and social changes that 
accompanied the transition to the land-based fur trade in two major arenas. The first 
involved the territorial expansion and increased slave raiding of the Lekwiltok beginning 
in the 1810s. The scale of Lekwiltok raiding in the Salish Sea as well as the connection of 
the growing land-based fur trade to an economy of captive ransoming is captured in 
journals of Fort Langley, built in 1827 by the ascendant Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), 
as well as in the private diaries of independent fur traders and Native oral histories. 
Lekwiltok raiding was incentivized by the presence of a complex slave-trading network 
on the northern Northwest Coast in which the Lekwiltok were the southernmost 
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participants. Lekwiltoks frequently funneled their Coast Salish captives north in 
exchange for furs or manufactures, indicating the changes brought to Indigenous slavery 
by the fur trade. The 1830s Battle of Maple Bay reflected these changes, both in its 
repercussions in the Salish Sea as well as in the unusual political circumstances manifest 
in this conflict. This represented a watershed moment in the evolution of a new socio-
economic landscape as a result of the shift from sea to land. 
 The second part of this chapter shifts the geography of change further north. At 
the center of developments on the northern Northwest Coast was the construction of Fort 
Simpson in 1834, which signaled the rising dominance of the HBC and the land-based fur 
trade. The fort grew within two years to become the most lucrative HBC post on the 
Northwest Coast, funneling thousands of furs to Europe and Asia and restructuring 
Native political and economic networks on the northern coast. Fort Simpson became the 
nexus of an economy of slave-trading and raiding on the northern coast which generated 
waves of violence. Crucial to this nexus was the influence of the land-based fur trade on 
the Indigenous potlatch system. The demand for abundant inland furs led to the 
emergence of highly wealthy Native middlemen, fueling the prosperity of such groups as 
the Fort Simpson Tsimshian and the Stikine Tlingit. In order to validate their rank and 
expand their influence, such middlemen expended their newfound wealth on increasingly 
lavish and frequent potlatch ceremonies. These displays necessitated the further 
acquisition of western goods and fueled the demand for captives as items of exchange 
and symbols of wealth. In this way, the growth of the land-based fur trade was 
intrinsically connected to the expansion of Indigenous slavery on the northern coast.  
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 In 1846, Great Britain and the United States agreed to partition much of the 
Northwest Coast south of Russian America (Oregon Country), a decision which 
ultimately paved the way for increased Euro-American immigration to the region and the 
emergence of settler-colonial regimes. The 1846 Oregon Treaty would signal yet another 
transformation of the Northwest Coast, one which saw the disappearance of the fur trade 
altogether. The fur trade nonetheless functioned, both in its maritime and land-based 
phases, as the vanguard of Euro-American colonialism on the Northwest Coast. The 
success of the fur trade, and especially the rise to dominance of the HBC, laid the 
foundations for the later success of the settler-colonial project. The wealth generated by 
the fur trade was made possible by the traffic in human bodies and the multiple 
dislocations it caused to Indigenous societies. The Battle of Maple Bay as recounted by 
Frank Allen represents a defining moment in the transformation of this traffic and the 
violence that followed in its wake. 
 
Salish Sea Slave-raiding and the Battle of Maple Bay 
 
By 1810, the decline of sea otter populations throughout the Northwest Coast 
grew increasingly apparent both to Euro-American maritime traders and to the Native 
peoples who had benefited the most from the trade. This decline, in addition to eating 
away at the fortunes of all parties involved, set in motion the transition to a new 
socioeconomic reality. Once abundant along the Northwest Coast, sea otters had by the 
first decades of the nineteenth century declined such that the once “monolithic” maritime 
fur trade increasingly diversified in order to remain profitable. Merchant ships 
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frequenting the coast turned to the trade in sandalwood from the Hawaiian Islands to 
bolster their earnings, and the rising trade in fur seals among American and Russian 
traders led to local declines in fur seal populations throughout the Pacific. Furthermore, 
though otter skins were traded well into the 1820s and beyond, the total numbers 
acquired continued to fall. A natural manifestation of this change was the increasing 
demand for and profitability of fur-bearing land mammals, while the locus of sea otter 
hunting shifted south to the Californias. Though the Northwest Coast fur trade remained 
largely maritime into the 1820s, its metamorphosis was accelerated by an additional 
development: the westward expansion of HBC operations.84 
As the regional influence of the Russian American Company (RAC) and the 
Bostonian traders who had previously dominated the sea otter economy diminished in 
relevance, the HBC extended its reach to the Northwest Coast under the oversight of Sir 
George Simpson, establishing a string of posts from the Columbia River to the Alaskan 
panhandle during the 1820s. The HBC had previously been active largely in the North 
American interior. In 1808, however, HBC man Simon Fraser descended the river that 
now bears his name, establishing a viable route from the British Columbian interior to the 
coast. In 1827, HBC expansion began in earnest with the construction of Fort Langley 
near the mouth of the Fraser River at the Salish Sea, and construction of forts Simpson 
and McLoughlin followed soon after. The commercial landscape of the Northwest Coast, 
however, was still largely contested during the late 1820s and early 1830s, with HBC 
forts still having to compete with American and Russian traders. The decisive moment 
came in 1839 when the ailing RAC agreed to lease its claimed territories in the Alaskan 
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Panhandle to the HBC in exchange for regular provisions to the former’s establishments. 
This enabled the HBC to build posts at the Tlingit villages of Taku and Stikine, and the 
agreement provided the company with the tools to construct a monopoly over the trade 
with Native people. This process, though gradual, effectively led to the consolidation of a 
new fur trade centered on trading posts, fundamentally recalibrating the Indigenous 
political and economic landscape which arose during the maritime period.85 
The transformation of the fur trade and the growing influence of the HBC 
coincided with the emergence of another development: the expansion of the Lekwiltok 
people and an accompanying spiral in violence. The name “Lekwiltok” refers collectively 
to a number of groups constituting the southernmost branch of Kwakwa’la speakers (or 
Kwakwa’wakw).86 The Kwakwaka’wakw people traditionally lived in the territory 
surrounding what are now the Johnstone Straits and adjacent areas on the British 
Columbia mainland and the east coast of Vancouver Island. In the early nineteenth 
century, at least seven Lekwiltok tribes are attested to: the Weewiakay, the Weewiakum, 
the Tlaaluis, the Walitsma, the Hahamatsees, the Kweeha, and the Komenox. By the mid-
nineteenth century, the Lekwiltok had overseen a dramatic southward territorial 
expansion that was unique among Northwest Coast peoples. This aggressive expansion, 
coming largely at the expense of Coast Salish groups in the Gulf of Georgia and other 
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parts of the Salish Sea, earned the Lekwiltok a fearsome reputation among Coast Salish 
peoples.87  
 The rise of the Lekwiltok as an expansive force is attributable to factors emerging 
from disruptions generated by the maritime fur trade. One such factor was the 
introduction of firearms into Indigenous trading networks. Kwakwaka’wakw groups on 
the east coast of Vancouver Island and in the vicinity of the Johnstone Straits and Gulf of 
Georgia reportedly obtained firearms by the end of the eighteenth century through trade 
with the Nuu-Chah-Nulth of western Vancouver Island. At the height of the maritime 
trade, Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholders, including Maquinna, extended their political 
networks of trade partners and tributaries, of whom some Kwakwaka’wakws became a 
part. It is likely that through lucrative connections between Nuu-Chah-Nulths and 
Kwakwaka’waks, the Lekwiltok obtained firearms earlier and in higher quantities than 
their Coast Salish neighbors. Indeed, while the naturalist Archibald Menzies noted the 
possession of firearms among Kwakwaka’wakws in 1792, very few firearms were in 
circulation among Coast Salish peoples in the Gulf of Georgia and Strait of Juan de Fuca 
in 1825, areas that would be hit hard by Lekwiltok raiding. In his account of his 
childhood and family history, Skagit informant John Fornsby recounts an attack in which 
a Lekwiltok war party traveled south, attacking a village on Whidbey Island in which 
Fornsby’s grandmother was residing. As told by Fornsby,  
The [Lekwiltok] came from way down north… They came with guns. The people 
on Whidbey Island didn’t have guns… My grandma ran up into the woods… They shot 
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her… They burned the big houses over at Coupeville and killed a lot of people… The 
people from up north took some young boys and made slaves out of them.88 
 
 Fornsby’s account, in addition to illustrating the violence that accompanied Lekwiltok 
slave raiding in the Salish Sea, clearly illustrates the disadvantage at which many Coast 
Salish peoples found themselves with regards to firearms. As such, the uneven 
distribution of firearms among Northwest Coast Indigenous groups during the maritime 
fur trade correlates with Lekwiltok expansion into the Salish Sea.89 
Much as with firearms, the introduction of European crowd diseases, particularly 
smallpox, during the period of the maritime fur trade created disruptions which later 
proved conducive to Lekwiltok expansion. Most Kwakwaka’wakw groups were spared 
during a number of late-eighteenth century smallpox outbreaks. Coast Salish groups, 
however, sustained heavy population losses during this same period, including an 
exceptionally devastating smallpox epidemic which struck the Gulf of Georgia in 1782, 
possibly spreading from the interior plains and plateaus via the Columbia and Fraser 
River Valleys. Additionally, a number of Coast Salish groups (particularly those in the 
Puget Sound region) experienced smallpox epidemics beginning in 1792, possibly as a 
result of contact during the Vancouver Expedition that year. Further catalyzing 
demographic decline among the Coast Salish was an 1801 smallpox outbreak which 
impacted most groups in the Gulf of Georgia and Puget Sound, while a “mortality” 
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(likely smallpox) was recorded in the region in 1824-25, shortly before the construction 
of Fort Langley. As Angelbeck and McLay note, such outbreaks (particularly of 
smallpox) not only led to depopulation among the Coast Salish, but further triggered a 
cascade of social breakdowns including the disappearance of entire villages, Coast Salish 
migrations, and the amalgamation of new refugee communities at a time when 
Lekwiltoks were largely spared such disruptions. While there is still a large degree of 
uncertainty as to why Lekwiltok groups expanded as quickly as they did, these factors 
almost certainly played a role in facilitating such conquests at the expense of Coast Salish 
peoples. There is, however, still a question as to why Lekwiltoks chose to expand their 
slaving operations so substantially and to raid increasingly for the sole purpose of 
obtaining captives.90 
 
 
 
Songhee war party returning to Fort Victoria after a successful raid c. 1847. Lekwiltok Raiders 
likely returned home from their excursions in a similar fashion.91 
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Part of this explanation may center on Lekwiltok involvement in a larger slave-
trading network that very likely made expeditions against the Coast Salish lucrative. In 
Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast, Leland Donald maps out a northern slave-
trade network as it likely operated prior to 1845 involving groups such as 
Kwakwaka’wakws, Tsimshians, Haidas, and Tlingits, further extending northwest to the 
Chugach as well as inland to Athapaskan peoples. Lekwiltok groups constituted the 
southernmost participants in this network, and while the network in question was highly 
complex and multidirectional, the general flow of captives was from south to north. Here 
the significance of the connection between southern and northern slave raiding activity 
and captive exchange among Indigenous groups becomes apparent. In the 1829 journal of 
his travels along the northern coast, the reverend and missionary Jonathan Green reported 
that slaves held by groups in the region such as Tsimshians obtained their chattel from 
farther south as “objects of frequent barter.”  This south-to-north movement of enslaved 
people is further corroborated by the HBC doctor William Fraser Tolmie, who in 1834 
reported intelligence from a Heiltsuk titleholder that Lekwiltoks traded war captives with 
other Kwakwa’la speakers to their north (principally Kwakiutls and Nawittis), who in 
turn dispersed these captives to Heiltsuks and other groups along the northern coast. 
Tolmie further reported having seen Cowichan slaves among the Stikine Tlingit during a 
visit the previous summer, indicating the sheer distance at which slaves were traded. This 
report is similar to one by HBC clerk John Dunn in his 1830s account of the Northwest 
Coast, who states that Heiltsuks purchased slaves from “southern tribes” for resale further 
north, attaining blankets, guns, furs, and skins in the process. Cowichans were among the 
Coast Salish groups which sustained frequent Lekwiltok raids, and thus it appears that 
89 
 
many of the captives taken by Lekwiltoks were funneled into this northern network for 
profit.92 
 In addition to the development of a northern slave-trading network in which the 
Lekwiltok were participants, Lekwiltok incursions into Coast Salish territory were likely 
connected to fundamental changes in the Indigenous potlatch system, a critical shift that 
will be further explored throughout this chapter. In her pioneering study of 
Kwakwaka’wakw potlatching and warfare, Fighting with Property, anthropologist Helen 
Codere outlines a significant expansion both in the frequency of Kwakwaka’wakw 
(including Lekwiltok) potlatches and in the sheer volume of goods distributed following 
contact with Europeans. Codere, however, asserts that although the expansion of 
Lekwiltok raiding was exceptional among Kwakwaka’wakws, the overall pattern of this 
warfare was not economically motivated, but rather conducted in accordance with 
symbolic prestige. This view has since been challenged, most notably by anthropologist 
R. Brian Ferguson. Ferguson asserts that Lekwiltok warfare was motivated fundamentally 
by the need for expanded access to items of trade, particularly woolen blankets, and that 
this need was a direct product of the fur trade. During the maritime fur trade, 
Kwakwaka’wakw groups were “marginal” given their geographic location far from the 
outer coast. With the shift to a land-based fur trade, Kwakwaka’wakw groups like the 
Lekwiltok were further disadvantaged in that they lacked strategic access to interior fur 
trade routes, and the primary mechanism by which they overcame this disadvantage was 
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through raiding and the slave trade previously mentioned. Raiding allowed the Lekwiltok 
to obtain trade goods not only through plunder, but through the highly lucrative trade in 
captives within the larger slave trading network. Increased raiding coincided with the 
expansion of the Kwakwaka’wakw potlatch during the early nineteenth century, resulting 
in a landscape of fear and violence for Coast Salish peoples.93 
 The emergence of Lekwiltok expansion and slave raiding, along with its traumatic 
consequences, is captured with unusual detail in the 1827-30 Fort Langley Journals. Built 
in 1827 by the HBC on the Fraser River several miles north of its mouth at the Salish 
Sea, Fort Langley was intended to both open up riverine trade between the coast and the 
British Columbian interior as well as to establish further land-based fur trade operations 
with Indigenous peoples. The journals, kept by HBC men George Barnston, James 
McMillan, and Archibald McDonald, describe slave raiding by Lekwiltoks and other 
groups in the Salish Sea region with revealing ethnographic detail. Lekwiltoks had been 
steadily expanding their territory southward beginning at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, and by 1827, Lekwiltok raids as far south as Puget Sound were a common 
occurrence, enmity between the Lekwiltok and Coast Salish peoples was well 
established, and a veritable economy of captive ransom had emerged.94  
 One example of the violent landscape in which the men of Fort Langley found 
themselves is evident in a series of entries made by Barston in the Summer of 1827. On 
August 11, a party of Skagits trading at the post reported their intent to recover a number 
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of women taken captive by the Lekwiltok earlier that summer. The women in question 
were taken during surprise raids and were of Skagit, Clallam, and Kwantlen origin. 
Additionally, one of the women was the sister-in-law of Scanawa, a Cowlitz trader who 
features prominently in the journals. On September 7, Barnston reported that Scanawa 
had ransomed his sister-in-law for the price of 7 to 8 company blankets along with other 
“trifling articles.” The ransom was reportedly arranged by the Lekwiltok wife of a local 
Indian man referred to as “The Doctor.” The very next day, the woman in question was 
murdered by a local Kwantlen man because the “poor creature had not been equally 
successful in recovering some women of his own tribe.” Rumors would later circulate 
that a group of Lekwiltoks intended to attack the fort in retaliation for the murder, a 
response characteristic of Indigenous conflict in the period. Though the presence of the 
Lekwiltok woman as a mediator in this exchange demonstrates that not all relations 
between Lekwiltoks and Coast Salish peoples were violent, this series of events 
illustrates the nature of Lekwiltok slave raiding and attests to arising patterns of 
vengeance. Furthermore, these events display features of the captive-exchange economy 
and its relationship to the fur trade. This trade thrived on the high value placed by many 
Indigenous groups on the acquisition of HBC blankets, which had come to function as a 
de facto currency in many parts of the Northwest Coast. The blankets were obtained from 
company men in exchange for furs. Scanawa’s use of such blankets to recover his captive 
sister-in-law partially shows the flow of material goods that made the taking of captives 
lucrative to raiders.95  
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 A similar sequence of events is recounted in the 1828 journal kept by James 
McMillan. On June 11-12, McMillan reported that a group of Musqueams were retreating 
up the Fraser River following a Lekwiltok raid in which six men were killed and thirty 
women and children taken captive. Two months later on August 11, a group of 
Musqueam families visited the fort and their leader, a man by the name of Shientin, 
reported an unsuccessful attempt to ransom the thirty captives from the Lekwiltok. 
Shientin further stated that the women and children were traded by the Lekwiltok to 
groups further up the coast as slaves and that the Lekwiltok had designs on the fort. 
Though no Lekwiltok attack on Fort Langley ever materialized, a number of company 
men did have a rather infamous armed encounter with Lekwiltoks at the mouth of the 
Fraser River. In 1828-29, there were several false alarms of an impending Lekwiltok 
attack among the Coast Salish groups camping within the vicinity of the fort. In an 1829 
entry, Archibald McDonald commented that “it is impossible to describe their [Coast 
Salish] alarm at the very name of this formidable foe [the Lekwiltok].” During the several 
false alarms mentioned, nearby Native people evacuated their women and children into 
the nearby forest or requested that they be allowed safety within the walls of the fort. The 
Fort Langley Journals give a strong impression of the violence accompanying Lekwiltok 
slave raids in the Salish Sea, and likewise the state of terror in which many of the 
region’s groups lived.96 
 Though the accounts of HBC men convey an impression of Coast Salish passivity 
and victimization in the face of Lekwiltok attack, the reality of Coast Salish resistance 
and retaliation complicates this image. The ethnographic record indicates that in the years 
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leading up to the Battle of Maple Bay, a number of retaliatory raids against the Lekwiltok 
were conducted by Coast Salish groups, and it is likely that these reprisals fueled further 
Lekwiltok slaves raids in the Salish Sea. Following a Lekwiltok attack at Point Roberts in 
which four Cowichans and one Snuneymuxw (Nanaimo) were killed, for example, 
McDonald reported in a September 1830 entry the galvanization of Coast Salish 
vengeance. A joint expedition of “upwards of 500 men” set north in war canoes to take 
revenge on the Lekwiltok. This expedition evidently proved a failure, and in October a 
number survivors straggled back to their homes. This was not, however, the last Coast 
Salish expedition for vengeance. As we have seen, sometime in the mid-1830s, an army 
of Coast Salish men drawn from numerous villages and numbering in the thousands 
successfully defeated a force of Lekwiltok at what is now Maple Bay on the east coast of 
Vancouver Island.97 
  
Maple Bay (Hwtl’upnets), British Columbia, in 2018. Photo taken by the author. 
 
Located between Vancouver Island and Salt Spring Island, the small cove of 
Maple Bay was perhaps a fitting place for the greatest act of Coast Salish resistance 
                                                           
97
 Ibid.; Angelbeck, “Conceptions of Coast Salish Warfare,” 260-83. 
94 
 
against the Lekwiltok. In the Halkomelem language, Maple Bay is known as 
Hwtl’upnets, or “Deep-Watered Place,” and is a space of great meaning in Coast Salish 
ontologies. Angelbeck and McLay note that during the prehistoric “Time of 
Transformation,” Hwtl’upnets was a “primordial battleground” between “supernatural 
and nonhuman beings,” whose entrance was guarded by Sheshuq’um, a “malevolent” 
entity known to spin whirlpools with its tongue, “drowning and devouring” travelers in 
their canoes before it was defeated and turned to stone. Coast Salish elders from 
Vancouver Island further relate that Cowichan warriors defeated the lightning snake 
Ts’inukw’a’ at Maple Bay, acquiring its spirit power. It was in this mythical landscape 
that the Coast Salish alliance waged one of the most consequential wars of the fur trade 
era. Furthermore, as Angelbeck and McLay note, this cultural and mythological 
landscape possessed immense symbolic importance for the Coast Salish alliance in that 
the later Battle of Maple Bay represented a continuity with past battles in Coast Salish 
ontologies, a continuity which is further “echoed” in Coast Salish oral histories of the 
conflict.98 
While some details are unclear and there is a degree of overlap between accounts, 
Angelbeck and McLay assert that there is an exceptional degree of consistency between 
Coast Salish oral histories of the events at Maple Bay. One such account is that of Frank 
Allen. Though William Elmendorf estimated that the great battle took place in 1845, 
Angelbeck and McClay conclude that it may have occurred as early as the 1830s. This 
seems reasonable, given the scale and devastation of Lekwiltok warfare in the late 1820s. 
Nevertheless, most key details remain the same despite disagreements over chronology. 
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Allen’s account provides the same rationale for action as glimpsed in the Fort Langley 
Journals. The Skokomish, like many other Coast Salish groups, participated in a multi-
group “war council” on Puget Sound, held among the Nisqually in response to the 
growing crisis of Lekwiltok slave raids. According to Allen, the famed Suquamish chief 
Kitsap took a leading role in war preparations and Leschi, the Nisqually leader later 
(erroneously) accused of plotting a “war of extermination” on the whites of Washington 
Territory, reportedly attended the meeting but declined to participate. Despite such 
notable abstentions, the anti-Lekwiltok coalition that embarked north included 
representatives from a majority of Coast Salish groups.99 
After a month or more of planning, the Coast Salish alliance embarked north in 
their canoes. The number of persons who were in the party remains unclear, and though it 
is possible that oral accounts exaggerate the number of warriors present, it appears likely 
that one thousand or more Coast Salish participated in the attack and that the Lekwiltok 
(though also numbering in the thousands) were outnumbered. The Coast Salish evidently 
knew that the Lekwiltok would pass between Salt Spring and Vancouver Islands, and 
according to Allen, the war party camped in the area of Maple Bay in anticipation of the 
Lekwiltok. The rising smoke of Lekwiltok campfires was sighted north of Maple Bay and 
several days and nights passed before the enemy was spotted by scouts positioned near 
the entrance of the narrows. Coast Salish warriors positioned their canoes out of sight 
around a bend and arranged a complex series of signals to time their strike, sending a set 
of canoes filled with women and old men into the middle of the bay as a decoy to draw 
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the advancing Lekwiltok into an ambush. The exact details of this ambush vary 
depending on the account, though all describe a situation in which the Lekwiltok were 
duped and surrounded by the Coast Salish flotilla. Frank Allen’s account describes a 
clamor of bullets and arrows. Scores of canoes were drawn into a melee as Coast Salish 
warriors stabbed and split Lekwiltok canoes with their spears. Angelbeck and McLay 
surmise that much of the Lekwiltok flotilla was crippled when Coast Salish warriors 
positioned on the bluffs above hurled boulders onto the canoes below them, and the bay 
swirled red with blood when Lekwiltoks were speared as they attempted to swim to 
shore. Though the exact number of Lekwiltoks killed during the confrontation remains 
unclear, given the estimated number of warriors present and the sheer destruction evident 
in oral accounts of the battle, Lekwiltok losses surely numbered in the hundreds. By 
nightfall, the victorious Coast Salish returned to their camps with Lekwiltok captives and 
built bonfires out of the wreckage of the canoes of the defeated. What resulted was a 
decisive defeat for the Lekwiltok that would recalibrate the political landscape of the 
Salish Sea.100 
The Battle of Maple Bay had significant ramifications for Indigenous diplomacy 
and relations in the Salish Sea region. Though some oral histories describe further Coast 
Salish expeditions against Lekwiltok villages, many with the intent to rescue family 
members enslaved in Lekwiltok raids, the events at Maple Bay appear to the represent a 
turning point at which larger wars between the two parties died down. Furthermore, these 
same accounts detail a process of diplomacy through which Coast Salish peoples and 
                                                           
100
 Allen, “Kitsap’s great battle with the Kwakiutl,” 145-153; Angelbeck and McLay, “The Battle at Maple 
Bay,” 360-85. 
97 
 
Lekwiltoks secured a tentative peace. These efforts largely entailed arranged marriages 
between individual families with the intended goal of establishing kinship and thus 
reducing the possibility of attack. The Lekwiltok evidently initiated one such peace effort 
by arranging the marriage of two high-ranked women to the Cowichan warriors 
“[Lexeawalas] and Tthasiyetan.” A Lekwiltok chief from Cape Mudge named Thuth-
Luth married a woman related to a leader of the Snuneymuxw of Vancouver Island, and 
two Snuneymuxw women married Lekwiltoks to “secure for their families immunity 
from war attacks.” In addition to illustrating the critical role played by Coast Salish and 
Lekwiltok women in the diplomatic process, such marriages additionally indicate the 
sophisticated political maneuvering these parties participated in through the use of 
kinship networks. As Angelbeck and McLay assert, political relations between Coast 
Salish peoples and the Lekwiltok were “transformed,” ending the era of Lekwiltok 
expansion into the Salish Sea and creating a new political landscape.101 
The political processes instigated by the Battle of Maple Bay are further 
noteworthy in that they were characterized by a remarkable degree of cooperation 
between autonomous Coast Salish communities and the creation of a (temporary) Coast 
Salish confederation. Among Coast Salish groups as well as most Northwest Coast 
peoples, the winter village represented the highest level of political organization, and the 
political cooperation necessary to make war typically involved a limited number of 
households linked by kinship. It was through these kinship networks, however, that the 
Coast Salish were able to mobilize such a large coalition. By calling upon such networks, 
the Coast Salish, whose political landscape was markedly heterarchical and decentralized, 
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were able to organize numerous villages and households from the bottom up, pulling in 
participants from all over the Salish Sea and even from further inland. The war against 
the Lekwiltok was likely the first regional coalition of such scale to have been organized 
in the post-contact period, and thus represents a notable inversion of previous patterns as 
well as a distinctive turning point in its own right in that the aftermath reshaped patterns 
of diplomacy and conflict in the Salish Sea region.102 
As anomalous as the Coast Salish confederation appears at the time of the Battle 
of Maple Bay, such political organization among Northwest Coast peoples was most 
likely the outcome of the colonial dislocations previously discussed. The shifting 
socioeconomic landscape as well as changing Indigenous political economies and the 
paramount role of captivity produced a violent, volatile context in the form of Lekwiltok 
expansion and increased slave raiding in the Salish Sea. This context demanded a Coast 
Salish response to what by 1830 was serious threat to these groups’ livelihoods, given the 
scale, frequency, and intensity of Lekwiltok forays into the Salish Sea. As indicated by 
the Fort Langley journals as well as Coast Salish oral histories, the destructive impact of 
Lekwiltok slave raids catalyzed the broad mobilization of autonomous Coast Salish 
communities, and this unity allowed for Coast Salish victory at Maple Bay and the 
ensuing political realignment of the region. These changes and their outcome were the 
product of interactions with Euro-Americans via the fur trade and alterations to 
Indigenous captivities. 
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Fort Simpson and Slavery on the North Coast 
 
 Throughout the 1830s and early 1840s, the northern reaches of the Northwest 
Coast culture zone emerged as a critical center of the new land-based fur trade order. 
Groups such as the Haida, Heiltsuk, Kwakiutl (northern Kwakwaka'wakw), and above 
all, the Tsimshian, emerged as central players in the expansion of HBC activities. 
Underpinning this shift was the establishment of Fort Simpson. Built initially at the head 
of the Nass River in 1831, Fort Simpson was re- established further upriver in 1834, deep 
within Coast Tsimshian territory. Within ten years, the post grew to become the most 
profitable and highly trafficked HBC center on the Northwest Coast. From its inception, 
Fort Simpson exhibited rapid growth. In 1841, the post reported returns ranging from 
3,000 to 4,000 beaver and otter along with other furs, netting the company £6,000 in 
gross income of which 3,000 was profit. Furthermore, the fort, built on land gifted to the 
HBC by the titleholder Legaic, became a center of Coast Tsimshian life and culture in its 
own right. By 1841, a community of 800 Tsimshians lived outside of the fort’s walls and 
almost 2,400 Coast Tsimshians lived within the fort’s orbit. In addition to its resident 
“home guard” Tsimshian population, Fort Simpson drew in vast numbers of Indigenous 
people from throughout the north coast to trade. In 1841 alone, the fort attracted almost 
14,000 visitors, of whom only 800 were Tsimshians from the area, indicating the sheer 
scale of its operations. On account of its intense economic activity and exponential 
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growth, Fort Simpson came to restructure Indigenous economies on the northern 
Northwest Coast. At the center of this transformation were Indigenous captivities.103 
 In addition to becoming the most important center of commerce for the HBC on 
the Northwest Coast, Fort Simpson and the Tsimshian community that crystallized 
around it had by 1835 grown into a “grand mart” of trade in slaves as well as furs. This 
development is evident in the journal kept by HBC agent John Work during the early 
decades of the post’s existence. In Work’s journal for the summer of 1835, multiple 
entries record transactions in slaves within the vicinity of the fort. On August 15, a party 
of Stikine Tlingit departed Fort Simpson having traded their trove of beaver skins to the 
local Tsimshian in exchange for a number of slaves. On August 22, a party of local 
Tsimshians returned to the settlement with beaver skins obtained at Tongass in exchange 
for “a lot” of slaves, mostly children, indicating that the fort itself was becoming the 
nexus around which the northern slave-trade network revolved. Exchanges in slaves 
between the Fort Simpson Tsimshian and the Tlingits of Tongass appear in the 
documentary record with great frequency. As one of the larger Indigenous settlements 
within the fort’s orbit, Tongass by 1835 functioned as one of Fort Simpson’s primary 
provisioners, providing critical foodstuffs and forging a close alliance with the Tsimshian 
of the fort. Much like the Tongass, Stikine Tlingits, themselves well-positioned as 
middlemen, were frequent visitors and provisioners to the fort. Likewise, Stikines were 
one of the main recipients of Tsimshian slaves purchased or captured further south, once 
again indicating the south-to-north trade in captives as well as the centrality Fort Simpson 
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assumed in this network. Many of the furs traded by Stikines at Fort Simpson were 
obtained via their lucrative middleman position relative to interior Athapaskan peoples. 
High Stikine demand for captives from further south was the product of intensive trade 
between themselves and interior Athapaskans whose demand for captives was likely 
spurred by sustained population loss resulting from disease outbreaks and from whom 
Stikines obtained the bulk of their furs. This demand is evident in the 1840 travel diary of 
Sir James Douglas, one of the preeminent HBC men active on the Northwest Coast and 
later governor of Vancouver Island. After arriving at Stikine, Douglas describes the 
village as having emptied out, the majority of whose inhabitants had either departed for 
trade in furs with interior peoples or “gone to Fort Simpson to purchase oil and slaves.” 
As such, Fort Simpson evolved into a major center for the north coast slave trade and 
there was a direct correlation between the fort’s profitability and human trafficking.104 
 The land-based fur trade stimulated slave raiding and slave trading on account of 
other factors, namely the ever-increasing Euro-American demand for furs and local 
declines in the availability of fur-bearing mammals. Much as with the collapse of sea 
otter populations throughout the coast, areas within the vicinity of various groups resident 
in the region of the northern Northwest Coast witnessed rapid declines in the availability 
of beavers, land otters, and other species which could be readily exploited for profit at a 
time when many communities developed a dependency on the fur trade as their 
economies shifted towards an emphasis on the procurement of furs for trade and the 
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social status of titleholders increasingly relied on the continued flow of European goods 
via the potlatch. Furthermore, increasing Euro-American demand for furs dovetailed with 
local declines in fur-bearing mammals to produce economic pressures for northern 
peoples in the context of this dependency. Such pressures arising from fur shortages were 
resolved through the exploitation of already-existing networks of trade by middlemen for 
the export of slaves. While coastal areas, hemmed in by the rugged topography of the 
coast mountains, experienced species declines, lands in the continental interior still 
possessed fur-bearing mammals in abundance. Coast-to-interior trading routes, which 
functioned in pre-European times as “grease trails” in the trade in eulachon fish and their 
oils, were transformed increasingly into conduits for providing north coast groups like the 
Coast Tsimshian and Tlingits access to the dominant source of furs. The trade in slaves 
with interior Athapaskans therefore grew into the primary means through which coastal 
middleman groups procured furs for trade with Europeans, resulting in ever more 
destructive patterns of slave raiding given the premium placed on captives in the slaving 
economy and European demand for furs.105 
 The increasing violence associated with these patterns was in large part linked to 
the growing value placed on slaves as objects of trade and markers of social status. One 
of Work’s entries at Fort Simpson references a “scarcity” of furs in 1838 that resulted in 
growing “poverty,” prompting north coast groups to grow “fond of property of which 
slaves constitute the principal part of what they possess.” In 1840, James Douglas visited 
the fur trade post and Tlingit settlement at Taku, leased from the RAC by the HBC. There 
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he witnessed a considerable traffic in slaves, remarking that “the species of property most 
highly prized among the natives of [Taku] is that of slaves, which in fact constitutes their 
measure of wealth.” Douglas further goes on to estimate the value of individual slaves as 
“18 to 20 skins a head,” noting that most were war captives taken in “predatory 
excursions” for which profit appeared to be the most likely motive. The high value placed 
on slaves in the northern coast was attributed at least partially to the value of slave labor, 
according to Donald. The Stikine titleholder Shakes, for example, possessed a retinue of 
twenty or more slaves whom he employed in performing subsistence activities and tasks 
necessary for the maintenance of his household. For titleholders such as Shakes, slave 
labor likely enabled such individuals to more freely pursue activities that allowed them to 
maintain their status, namely trading and potlatching. More importantly, as the success of 
Indigenous economies on the north coast grew increasingly entangled in the fur trade, 
slave labor could be repurposed for the acquisition, treatment, and transport of furs for 
trade. As such, the importance placed by titleholders on taking or purchasing captives in 
the nineteenth century was catalyzed by the fur trade economy and slave populations 
increased among certain north coast communities as a result.106 
 The increasing premium placed on slaves by north coast groups was likewise the 
product of changes to the Indigenous potlatch system brought about by an influx in 
valued goods resulting from the fur trade. A highly complex and mature relationship 
between the potlatch system, captivity, and the land-based fur trade evolved along the 
northern coast during the 1830s-40s. In order to secure and maintain sociopolitical status 
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in the shifting fur trade economy, titleholders held more frequent (and more lavish) 
potlatch ceremonies in which ever larger volumes of trade goods were distributed. Such 
ceremonies necessitated the continued acquisition of goods, creating a cycle of exchange 
in which captives were essential. The role of the potlatch in this cycle was vividly 
displayed in Work’s journal as well as in the work of Leland Donald and anthropologist 
Donald Mitchell. One particular series of events captured in the Fort Simpson Journals 
illuminates this role. On December 4, 1837, a party of Coast Tsimshian bearing furs and 
headed by Legaic arrived at Fort Simpson bearing news of a great feast potlatch. The 
potlatch was hosted by Sebassa, a highly wealthy and influential titleholder from the 
Tsimshian village of Kitkatla, and on December 14, Legaic and his men had departed for 
the occasion. Sebassa’s potlatch triggered a sequence of events in which captivity was 
central, as the analyses of Donald and Mitchell demonstrate. In accordance with custom, 
Legaic pledged to hold a return potlatch for Sebassa and his people, obliging the latter to 
make preparations for the event. These preparations included a deadly raid on the Nawitti 
Kwakwaka’wakw in which twenty women were taken captive, including the daughter 
and wife of a titleholder. According to Work, a group of Stikine Tlingit titleholders 
departed Fort Simpson after trading on August 18, 1838, for Kitkatla. On August 24, the 
Stikine party returned to the fort with a number of newly purchased Nawitti slaves, 
including the daughter previously mentioned and some of her “companions.” In October, 
Sebassa and a party from Kitkatla arrived at the fort with a wealth of furs to exchange for 
various manufactures. A portion of the furs, notes Work in his journal, were obtained by 
Sebassa from the Stikine party previously mentioned. Donald describes this series of 
events as the “best-documented sequence of slave raiding, trading, and feasting” known 
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in the literature, and indeed, it clearly indicates the symbiotic relationship between 
Indigenous slavery, the potlatch system, and the land-based fur trade as it evolved during 
the nineteenth century.107 
 
 
 Tsimshian potlatch in the late-nineteenth century. The titleholders are seated in the middle.108 
 
 Slaving activities connected to Fort Simpson continued well into the 1840s. One 
manifestation of this connection was the centrality of the fort in the northern slave 
network’s ransom economy and its accompanying violence. In August 1842, a Tsimshian 
chief known as Nislaganoose departed Fort Simpson with his two wives and three others 
(two men and one woman) to fish for salmon and gather berries at nearby Pearl Harbor 
inlet. Shortly after arriving, the party was ambushed by a group of Cumshewa Haidas 
who had been scouting the area for potential slaves. Following the ensuing altercation, 
one of Nislaganoose’s wives along with another woman were taken captive while one of 
the men was beheaded. What followed was a series of events highlighting the importance 
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of Fort Simpson to the regional system of captivity on the northern coast. One of the 
captive wives was released by her captors upon their learning of her Tongass origin, as 
they had kin relations with the latter. Nislaganoose later learned from a runaway slave 
that the second wife was being held by Cumshewa Haidas in the Queen Charlotte Islands 
(Haida Gwaii). As reported in Work’s journal, the Cumshewa Haidas had been in the area 
during the wives’ disappearance and had a reputation for kidnapping in the vicinity of the 
fort. In the fort’s entry for September 6, Work records that a party of Nislaganoose’s 
Sebassa relations arrived from Kitkatla, trading furs for ammunition before departing for 
Haida Gwaii the following morning in a war party of upwards of 100 men. Two days 
later, the party returned with Nislaganoose’s kidnapped wife and a store of potatoes 
plundered from the Haida which they promptly sold to the fort. In this sequence of 
events, Fort Simpson’s role in slaving-related activities is evident in multiple dimensions. 
Not only was the fort at the center of the northern slave trade, but its immediate vicinity 
was exploited for kidnappings by various groups, including Haidas. Lacking access to 
middleman trade routes and limited by their position on the outer coast in the land-based 
fur trade geography, Haidas likely raided in the vicinity of Fort Simpson during their 
trading excursions as economic leverage given the value of individual slaves and the 
lucrative nature of the ransom economy. As John Work reported later in August 
following the return of Nislaganoose, a party of Kaigani Haidas was “prowling about” in 
the area looking to kidnap local Tsimshians.109 Furthermore, the events chronicled by 
Work in the Summer of 1842 not only illustrate the general flow of trade goods such as 
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ammunition and furs, but aid in mapping out the geography of violence and captivity that 
coalesced around Fort Simpson. 
 By the 1850s, Fort Simpson began to gradually decline in importance. With the 
establishment and rapid growth of Fort Victoria, later the provincial capital of Vancouver 
Island and British Columbia, much of Fort Simpson’s trade was lost to the former. As 
settlement and industrial development in the Salish Sea region accelerated in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, many groups from the north coast bypassed Fort Simpson 
to trade further south and to take advantage of wage labor activities, prompting the 
emergence of yet another new economic landscape as well as new raiding and slaving 
patterns. It is important to note, however, that the rise of HBC wealth and monopoly in 
what would become British Columbia was facilitated by the economies and immense 
capital generated by Fort Simpson. Indeed, Fort Simpson in its early decades was the 
linchpin of the new land-based fur trade order, and its rise to prominence was 
fundamentally linked to Indigenous captivities and an economy of violence on the 
northern Northwest Coast. In inserting itself at the center of preexisting Indigenous 
trading and slaving networks, activities at Fort Simpson prompted the transformation of 
Native political economies, resulting in the expansion of Native slavery in the region. 
The emergence of Indigenous middlemen and changes to the potlatch system created 
newer- and more destructive- captive exchange networks. These networks and their 
accompanying violence made the growth and profitability of Fort Simpson possible, 
aiding the HBC in its ascendance and laying the groundwork for later colonial 
ventures.110  
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Conclusion 
 
Map of Oregon Country, the territory disputed between the United States and Great Britain.111 
 
 In 1846, the question of legal ownership of Oregon Country was resolved. After 
decades of nominal “joint occupancy,” the United States and Great Britain formally 
agreed to split Oregon Country in two between themselves, transferring much of the 
Northwest Coast south of Russian Alaska to an established colonial power and an 
emerging one. Though the dividing line placed along the forty-ninth parallel was for 
years after 1846 little more than an abstraction to the peoples of the Northwest Coast, its 
creation would signal the end of an era. Shortly after the 1846 agreement, Euro-American 
settlement on Puget Sound and in the vicinity of Victoria began to gradually intensify, 
and with it, the power of two hegemonic states. 1846 and the international politics 
represented by this year ultimately set the stage for the creation of settler-colonial 
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regimes on the Northwest Coast. By 1900, the autonomy and power of Indigenous 
communities in the region were compromised. With the coming of miners, farmers, 
missionaries, and settler states, Native customs came under fire, and Indigenous 
captivities were among the practices to be gradually extinguished.  
 It is important to note, however, that the fur trade on the Northwest Coast, 
particularly in its land-based form, functioned as the vanguard of Euro-American 
colonialism. The fur trade and the rise of the Hudson’s Bay Company created the capital 
and infrastructure necessary for the eventual settler-colonization of the Northwest Coast. 
Beginning in the 1840s, fur trade posts in many cases formed the nuclei of future white 
settlement. This is particularly evident in the evolution of Victoria from the site of an 
HBC fort to the provincial capital. Furthermore, the mobilization of personnel by the 
HBC allowed for the creation of colonial knowledges, most notably in cartography and 
the surveying of resources for future economic endeavors. As we have seen, the 
entanglement of Indigenous middleman groups in the burgeoning land-based fur trade 
created economic dependencies, dependencies which were readily exploited by colonial 
agents and settlers in the late-nineteenth century. Such evolutions, however, were entirely 
contingent on the success and profitability of the trade in furs. The capital, manpower, 
and resources imbricated in the land-based fur trade made the later success of Euro-
American settlement possible, and all of these factors were ultimately dependent on 
Indigenous participation, economic, political or otherwise. Bound up in these connections 
were Indigenous captivities. 
 The changes wrought on the Indigenous Northwest Coast by the maritime fur 
trade produced immense political, economic, and demographic dislocations which in turn 
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created a landscape of violence. With the decline of sea otter populations and the 
transition to a land-based fur trade, these dislocations were further compounded. The 
Indigenous institution of slavery played a crucial role in this process and in generating its 
outcome. Both the Salish Sea region and the northern Northwest Coast were at the center 
of these dislocations. Lekwiltok expansion, Coast Salish political unification, and the 
Battle of Maple Bay were the products of changes emerging from the fur trade, as was 
the rise of Fort Simpson as the nexus of slaving activities on the north coast. Violence, 
captivity, and colonialism thus triangulated to form forces that not only transformed 
Indigenous societies on the Northwest Coast, but ultimately produced outcomes that 
aided the colonizer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Peace dance held at a Kwakwaka’wakw potlatch circa 1983.112  
 
In 1987, the small town of Campbell River on the northeast coast of Vancouver 
Island hosted a momentous event in the long history of British Columbia’s Indigenous 
people. There, Qwiqwasutinuxw and Nuxalk delegates convened to hold a peace potlatch 
designed to mend ties between the two peoples almost 130 years after the disastrous 
Nuxalk raid at Gwayasdums. The potlatch, attended by Agnes Alfred, her son-in-law 
Chief James Sewid, and numerous representatives from throughout the Northwest Coast, 
culminated in the signing of a peace treaty between the Nuxalk and Qwiqwasutinux and 
marked a rapprochement regarding the raid and its outcome.113 That these two 
communities oversaw such a profound moment more than a century after the raid at 
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Gwayasdums speaks volumes to the deep residual scars engendered by the conflict. 
Though the Campbell River potlatch stands as distinctive in the twentieth century history 
of the Indigenous Northwest Coast, it is representative of the lasting consequences of the 
nineteenth century, its developments, and the legacy of Euro-American colonialism in the 
region.  
The attack at Gwayasdums whose wounds the 1987 peace potlatch sought to 
mend occurred in a context which evolved over one-hundred years of radical, violent 
change on the Northwest Coast. Beginning with first encounters and the emergence of the 
maritime fur trade in 1774, the slave-holding societies of the Northwest Coast 
experienced economic, social, and political alterations stemming from the material 
influence of Euro-American colonialisms. The first thirty years of the maritime fur trade 
witnessed the emergence of powerful Indigenous middlemen on the outer coast such as 
the Nuu-Chah-Nulth titleholders Maquinna and Wickaninnish, the rise of whom was 
bolstered by new western goods such as firearms. The ascendance of such figures 
resulted in waves of “displaced violence” in which slave raiding and the taking of 
captives functioned as a tool for the consolidation of economic and political power in a 
new colonial landscape. Furthermore, captivity came to function as an underlying 
component of Indigenous-Euro-American interactions as well as those between Native 
communities. Euro-Americans utilized captivity in the form of hostage-taking throughout 
the maritime fur trade era to leverage their political and economic demands in scenarios 
in which they had limited power. A particularly destructive aspect of maritime fur trade 
captivity arose in the form of the forced prostitution and sexual slavery of Indigenous 
women, a situation in which Euro-American men exploited the presence of slaves and 
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social hierarchies in Native societies. Much like the “displaced violence” emerging from 
the trade, sexual slavery produced severe dislocations for Indigenous communities on the 
Northwest Coast in that it accelerated the spread of infectious diseases that spelled 
calamity for Native people. Though these developments benefited certain Indigenous 
communities and individuals in the short-term, they ultimately undermined Northwest 
Coast societies and benefited the colonizers in the long run. 
In Alaska, too, the effects of the fur trade and Euro-American colonialism 
witnessed disruptions to Native life in which captivity played a central role. When the 
Russian Empire began its southward march into Tlingit Country in 1792, the Shelikhov-
Golikov Company and the Russian American Company had constructed a colonial 
enterprise predicated on the unfree labor of Indigenous people. The captive labor 
practices enforced on Aleut and Alutiiq peoples for the benefit of Russian fur trade 
interests created an economic foundation which Russians attempted to graft onto Tlingit 
Country, producing a volatile situation which ultimately escalated into outright war in 
1802-4. Russian America’s systems of unfree labor jeopardized Tlingit economic 
interests and convinced many Tlingit leaders that the invaders wished to enslave them, 
and when the 1802-4 Tlingit uprising came, the conflict as well as its various negotiations 
was fundamentally characterized by captivity. Furthermore, the outcome of the conflict 
and its processes ultimately weakened the Russian American Company’s ability to 
expand, altering the imperial landscape of the Northwest Coast in such a way that other 
colonial players (namely the British Empire and United States) were able to further 
capitalize on their interests in the region. 
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With the decline of the maritime fur trade and its metamorphosis into a land-
based economy, the Northwest Coast was transformed anew, and captivity was again 
central to these changes. As the British Hudson’s Bay Company began its ascendance, 
the changing fur trade economy fostered new waves of violence in the southward 
expansion of the Lekwiltoks at the expense of Coast Salish peoples. South-to-north slave 
trading routes and the Indigenous potlatch system were reshaped by the fur trade 
economy, creating an economic impetus for slaving activities that dovetailed with 
Lekwiltok expansion. These factors resulted in a geography of violence in the Salish Sea 
region which culminated in the united Coast Salish offensive against the Lekwiltok at 
Maple Bay, an event which further changed the Indigenous sociopolitical landscape. 
Furthermore, such developments in the Salish Sea region were connected to concurrent 
changes on the northern Northwest Coast emerging from the construction of Fort 
Simpson in Tsimshian Country. Fort Simpson, which by the 1830s had become the 
Hudson Bay Company’s most important post in the Northwest, enmeshed itself in 
regional Indigenous economies and evolved into the center of the north coast slaving 
economy. The land-based fur trade economy created by Fort Simpson recalibrated 
Indigenous slave-trading and ransoming practices through the transformation of the 
potlatch system, creating a symbiotic relationship between the fort’s profitability and 
slavery in the region which ultimately provided the Hudson’s Bay Company with 
necessary capital and paved the way for the development of settler-colonial formations in 
the region.  
When the Nuxalk raid at Gwayasdums transpired in the late 1850s, white settler-
colonization of the Northwest Coast was well underway following the division of 
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“Oregon Country” between the United States and Britain in 1846. The formation of 
settler societies on the Northwest Coast was preceded by decades of political, economic, 
and social transformations (and dislocations) generated by the maritime and land-based 
fur trades, processes in which captivity (both Indigenous and Euro-American) were 
central. When Agnes Alfred’s ancestors awoke to find their village under siege and their 
people enslaved, the Qwiqwasutinuxw became subjects of violence produced under a 
colonial context decades in the making. Furthermore, captivity and slavery were 
fundamental to the making of this context, one which had immense repercussions for the 
Indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast. The 1987 peace potlatch at Campbell River 
was but one symbolic manifestation of this legacy. 
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